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Ulrich: Indemnification of Corporate Directors: A Disincentive to Corpora

NOTES
INDEMNIFICATION OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS:
A DISINCENTIVE TO CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDIANA
INTRODUCTION

During the last half century, the business corporation has become
an important force in American society.' As the number of incorporated businesses has risen and the corporations themselves have
grown, government and legislators have sought to control the affairs
of these powerful and wealthy enterprises. In recent years, public
awareness of the social responsibility of large corporations has become
more acute. Increasingly complex regulatory systems govern both the
internal and external workings of modern corporations. Thus, the
regulatory schemes promulgated by legislatures often serve to
establish strict codes of conduct for corporate management and directors whose ultimate responsibility must be to the shareholders and
public.2 The corporate director' who violates the requirements of one
of the multitude of regulations risks incurring personal liability from
myriad sources unheard of several decades ago.4
As the possibilities for personal liability of corporate directors
have expanded, there have been concomitant attempts to insulate
those in authority from that liability. Various strategies have been

1. Johnson and Osborne, The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in a Litigious
Society, 15 VAL. U.L. REV. 49, 50-51 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Johnson and Osborne].
2. See generally Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of CorporateDirectors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1967) [hereinafter

cited as Bishop, New Trends]; W.

KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIREC-

(2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as KNEPPER]; Johnston, Corporate Indemnification
and Liability Insurancefor Directors and Officers, 33 Bus. LAW. 1993 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Johnston]; M. SCHAEFTLER, THE LIABILITIES OF OFFICE: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS (1976) [hereinafter cited as SCHAEFTLER].
3. The term "director" shall be used for the sake of simplicity throughout
this note. The statutes discussed herein apply to directors, officers, agents and
employees. For full discussion of the argument favoring clear distinction between status
as director, officer, employee and agent, see infra notes 300-308 and accompanying text.
4. Sebring, Recent Legislative Changes in the Law of Indemnification of Directors, Officers and Others, 23 Bus. LAW. 95, 98 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Sebring];
SCHAEFTLER, supra note 2, at 3-5; Johnston, supra note 2, at 1993-1994.
TORS
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employed with varying degrees of success. The primary methods used
to insulate directors from possible personal liability arising from their
actions as director or from their official status have been indemnification clauses 5 and insurance policies.'
Indemnification clauses and insurance policies exist in several
forms. All states have now enacted indemnification provisions as part
of their corporation laws, 7 and many states allow inclusion of indemnification clauses in the corporation's by-laws or charter.8 In addition,
most states also allow for the purchase of Directors' and Officers'
Insurance.' By employing a combination of indemnification provisions
and insurance policies, coupled with the protection afforded under the
Business Judgment Rule," corporations are often able to effectuate
for their directors" a virtually impenetrable shield' 2 from personal
liability.

5. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 692 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
defines the term "indemnification" as denoting compensation given to make the person whole from a loss already sustained. Thus, in the context of corporation law, the
corporation seeks to reimburse a director for expenses of defense, fines, judgments,
and settlements incurred when he is sued either in a stockholder derivative action
or third-party suit. Under many modern indemnification statutes, the indemnification
process may enable payment of expenses, etc., for the director immediately without
initial payment by the individual and subsequent reimbursement by the corporation.
6. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 721 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Insurance policies
referred to in the context of this discussion are directors' and officers' liability insurance policies. These policies offer compensation to the director and the corporation
for liability of the director arising out of his capacity as director of the corporation.
7. SCHAEFTLER, supranote 2, at 11. Illinois was the last state to adopt indemnification provisions as part of the state corporation law in 1978.

8. See McAdams, A Proposal to Amend the Indemnification Section (S 5) of
the Model Business Corporation Act, 31 Bus. LAW 2123, 2126 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as McAdams]. State statutes which are non-exclusive allow for inclusion of indemnification provisions other than the statutory rights. Commonly, indemnification provisions
are included by in-laws, articles of incorporation or employment contracts.
9. [hereinafter referred to as D & 0 insurance].
10. See generally SCHAEFTLER, supra note 2, at 93-97; Johnson and Osborne,
supra note 1; A. COHEN AND R. LOEB, DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS, 22-23 (1978). The Business Judgment Rule was stated as follows in Pollitz v. Wabash
R.R. Co., 207 N.Y. 113, 124, 100 N.E. 721, 724 (1912):
Questions of policy of management, expediency of contracts of action, adequacy of consideration, lawful appropriation of corporate funds to advance
corporate interests, are left solely to [the directors'] honest and unselfish
decision, for their powers therein are without limitation and free from
restraint and the exercise of them for the common and general interests
of the corporation may not be questioned, although the results show what
they did was unwise or inexpedient.
11. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 1993.
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Personal liability in the context of the corporate board of directors may be premised upon two philosophical alternatives. If the
primary purpose of liability is merely compensation to an individual
or group of individuals for harm inflicted by the director's breach of
fiduciary duty, then the concept of indemnifying directors through
the use of corporate provisions or insurance policies is consistent with
the ultimate goal. However, where the primary purpose of liability
is viewed as the deterrence policy of precluding future breach, then
today's liberal indemnification provisions are repugnant to that goal.
Such a view of the underlying rationale for liability necessarily implies a broad public purpose to be served.13 Liability is imposed upon
directors not solely for reasons of recompense, but for reasons of curtailing the abuse of private power exercised to the detriment of society. Hence, corporate accountability is a responsibility to society as
a whole, not merely to individuals. The argument against modern indemnification statutes is therefore utilitarian.'4 The ultimate goal of
achieving a satisfactory level of public accountability from modern corporations is thwarted by enactment of liberal indemnification statutes
which enable directors to evade personal liability for their actions.
12. See Bishop, New Trends, supra note 2, at 1095. These measures generally
afford protection from liability from all but the most flagrant abuses of power such
as gross negligence, self-dealing or total abdication of corporate responsibility.
13. See Stratton Group, Ltd. v. Sprayregen, 466 F. Supp. 1180, 1185 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 166 vacated
on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (D. Del. 1974); Sherlee Land v. Commonwealth United
Corp., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,749 at 93,274 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); SEC v. Continental
Growth Fund, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
91,437 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
14. During the 1971 American Bar Association's National Institute on Officers'
and Directors' Responsibilities and Liabilities, Professor Joseph W. Bishop stated that,
[he] would be happier if in all cases . . . indemnification were permitted only
t.
with the approval of a court." See KNEPPER, supra note 2, at 408, also at 405-14. See
also infra note 57.
In general, the notion expressed by Professor Bishop is indicative of the desired
attitude toward indemnification of corporate directors. Where business coporations
control such a vast amount of the nation's wealth, it is necessary to keep the public
informed of corporate dealings. Directors must maintain the highest integrity in their
transactions and must act in accordance with the fiduciary duties owed the corporation. Corporate laws are enacted to ensure that no fraud is perpetrated upon the public.
If indemnificaton of corporate directors is blindly allowed at the corporation's discretion, there is no guarantee of proper conduct. The corporation as a business entity
must recognize its responsibility to society and reward only deserving directors with
indemnity.
In addition, the public should be informed of important corporate transactions
to provide a check upon the conduct of management. As Profesor Bishop further comments: "In sum, I think that the practice of protecting corporate executives against
litigation and liability has now been carried about as far as it ought to be carried
and perhaps a little farther. Corporate directors and officers should eschew efforts
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In an age of heightened consciousness of the importance of corporate accountability and fear of the power wielded by corporate
America in modern society, the current lack of enforceable liability
is regrettable. When the lack of enforceable liability is considered with
a recognized need to attract competent people to the corporate board,
the core of this complex problem is reached. The difficulty inherent
in our system of corporate law is that of striking a delicate balance
between the need to punish errant fiduciaries and the need to protect aggressive managers who are willing to take good faith risks
within the scope of their fiduciary duty in the search for profits. 5
This note examines the legal and ethical issues raised by the
use of various forms of indemnification provisions. A historical perspective on the principle of indemnification as it arose from the common
law of agency and emerged in case decisions aids in the analysis of
the two basic types of modern indemnification statutes. Next, the ambiguities and leniency inherent in each type of statute is investigated.
In light of the conclusions drawn from these analyses, the present
Indiana statutory provision relating to indemnification of corporate
directors is examined and proposals for revision advanced."
HISTORY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF INDEMNIFICATION

The principle of indemnification of corporate directors has its
to protect themselves . . .from the consequences of breach of their duty .. .in the
management of (corporate) affairs. And if directors and officers do not show such selfrestraint, then legislatures and courts should supply the deficiency." Bishop, New Trends,
supra note 2, at 1103.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has declared their disapproval
of indemnification provisions in both statutory and by-law formulation. It is asserted
that indemnification provisions may not be effective when the liability arises out of
transactions in which the SEC is interested. For example, where the liability arises
out of violation of sections 11 or 12 of the 1933 Act or sections 10(b), 14(a) and 14(e)
of the 1934 Act, the Congressional intent was "to impose a duty of competence as
well as innocence." Thus, this intent is thwarted if indemnity is granted. Application
of Rule 460, which requires disclosure of the company's indemnification provisions before
allowing acceleration of their registration statement, enforces adoption of the SEC's
position endorsing restricted use of indemnification. The SEC is of the opinion that
many indemnification provisions are violative of public policy and, therefore, the Commission has adopted these methods of enforcement of public policy. KNEPPER, supra
note 2, at 410.
15. See Johnston, supra 2, at 1993.
16. The scope of this note will not include extensive discussion of the various
liabilities incurred for violation of securities laws or antitrust laws. Rather, the focus
of this note will be upon the possibilities for abuse of modern, liberal indemnification
statutes as they exist in Delaware, New York and Indiana.
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roots in the common law of agency.17 The nature of the corporate structure and uncertainty as to the status of corporate directors under
traditional agency law led early courts confronted with the issue to
deny directors a common law right to indemnification. 8 During the
evolution of modern corporate law, the director's right to indemnification was gradually defined and is now well recognized. Today, with
corporations operating in an increasingly complex web of regulatory
systems, the right of indemnification is often a critical factor for the
businessman contemplating acceptance of a position on the board of
directors. 9 Under the modern, liberal indemnification statutes, protection is guaranteed in numerous circumstances and often granted
in a wide range of situations." The liberalized indemnification provisions of modern corporation statutes, charters, and by-laws are barely
indentifiable as descendants of the courts' early decisions in this area.
A widely recognized axiom in the common law of agency is that
a principal is under a duty to indemnify his agent for any liability
for tort or breach of contract the agent might incur to a third party
while acting within the scope of his authorized employment."' Uncertainty results, however, in the application of this fundamental concept to agents acting within the corporate structure. Third-party
actions 2 must be distinguished from shareholder derivative suits instituted on behalf of the corporation." Additionally, the various
methods of disposition of a lawsuit 4 must be confronted as they may
occur in either a derivative suit or a third-party action. In light of

17. RESTATEMENT (Second) of Agency S 439(c) (1958).
18. New York Dock Co., Inc. v. McCollom, 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup.
Ct. 1939). This case was decided prior to enactment of the New York indemnification
statute.
19. McAdams, supra note 8, at 2124.
20. See Bishop, New Trends, supra note 2; Sebring, supra note 4, at 98-99.
21. See supra note 17; Bibb v. Allen, 149 U.S. 481, 498 (1893).
22. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1327 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Generally, a third party
is one not a party to an agreement or transaction but who may have rights therein.
In the context of corporation law, the third party may bring suit against a director
for alleged wrongdoing. However, the director does not owe a fiduciary duty to the
third party as he does to shareholders.
23. The court in Solimine v. Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 265, 19 A.2d 344,
345 (1941), emphasized the true character of the derivative suit: "The stockholders,
suing and intervening, do not prosecute the cause in their own right and own benefit
but in the right of the coporation and for its benefit. While nominally the company
is named as defendant, actually and realistically it is the true complainant, for any
avails realized from the litigation belong to it and it alone."
24. The possible methods of disposition of a lawsuit are: adjudication on the
merits, settlement, dismissal, and procedural termination.
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these many alternatives, early courts were faced with the monumental task of applying fundamental agency law to the corporate structure.
The difficulties of distilling the principles to be applied in indemnification of corporate directors from the common law of agency
became apparent in a series of cases litigated during the first half
of this century. In 1939, New York Dock., Inc. v. McCollomn5 denied
the common law right to indemnity with the proposition that directors who successfully defended themselves in a derivative action were
not entitled to indemnification for their legal fees absent a showing
that the corporation had benefited from their defense." The benefit
contemplated by the court did not consist of the intangible benefits
of restitution of the corporation's good name or, initially, attracting
capable managers to the board. The court in McCollom sought a more
concrete benefit arising from the corporation's payment of indemnity.
A decade later the standard applied in McCollom was rejected by
courts in other jurisdictions 7 which upheld the common law right of
a vindicated director to recover the expenses of his defense without
any showing of a specific benefit to the corporation.
In reconciling these cases, it is clear that the courts began to
recognize a valid benefit to the corporation both through the ability
to attract qualified board members and also through the defense and
vindication of its directors. Recognition of these valid concerns
establishes the foundation for the principles of indemnification. The
New Jersey court in Solimine v. Hollander's specifically enumerated
the policy reasons for allowing a corporation to indemnify its directors: (1) to encourage innocent directors to resist unjust charges and
provide them an opportunity to hire competent counsel; (2) to induce
responsible businessmen to accept the post as directors; and (3) to
discourage "strike" litigation by stockholders.' The policies established
in Solimine survived and proved to be the primary impetus for adoption of modern indemnification statutes.'
25. 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
26. Id.
27. Solimine v. Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (1941); In re E.C.
Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W.2d 388 (1950).
28. 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (1941).
29. Id. "Strike" stockholder suits are usually derivative actions brought with
the expectation of winning exorbitant attorney fees or private settlements. These suits
are generally brought to harass management with no real intention of benefitting the
corporation in whose behalf the suit is theoretically brought..See Shapiro v. Magaziner,
418 Pa. 278, 282, 210 A.2d 890, 894 (1965).
30. See Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888, 898 (3d Cir.
1953); Sebring, supra note 4, at 98; McAdams, supra note 8, at 2124.
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In response to the McCollom decision, business-oriented states
quickly adopted statutory provisions authorizing corporations to indemnify directors under certain circumstances.31 New York was the
first state to adopt an indemnification statute in 1941, followed in 1943
by Delaware and then by nearly all the states.2 Early attempts at
statutory indemnification were vague and consequently ambiguous,
evidencing an effort to virtually immunize management from personal
liability.' Both courts and corporations encountered difficulties in
ascertaining what types of actions against directors were covered and
the extent of their coverage. ' To further complicate matters, the
permissive3" nature of the' first Delaware statute, which served as the
model for many state statutes, did little to establish for directors a
clear right to indemnification. The first Delaware statute merely empowered the corporation to indemnify directors at its discretion, but
did not create an enforceable right to indemnity for the director. The
ambiguities of these early statutes provided the impetus for many
states to enact revised, comprehensive forms of their indemnification
provisions.
During the 1960's many state legislatures' altered their indemnification statutes in an attempt to confront both the lack of clarity
which characterized the initial statutes, and the prodigious problem
of director liability with respect to securities law and antitrust law.
As the business corporation continued to assume a more important
role in the expanding post-war economy,37 there were increases in the
number of lawsuits and in the size of judgments rendered against
corporations and individual directors.38 Expansion of substantive
regulation as well as development of diverse enforcement mechanisms
such as class action suits, derivative suits, and SEC investigative proceedings have generated myriad ways of holding directors liable for
31. KNEPPER, supra note 2, at 405.
32. Brook, Directors' Indemnification and Liability Insurance, 21 N.Y.L.F. 1,
3 [hereinafter cited as Brook]. For a thorough discussion of early indemnification provisions, see G. WASHINGTON AND J. BISHOP, INDEMNIFYING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE
(1963).
33. Bishop, New Trends, supra note 2, at 1079.
34. Fenton, Indemnification 4 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 790, 791 (1979); Johnston, supra
note 2, at 1995. The uncomprehensive nature of the early statutes entailed the existence of no distinction between third-party and derivative actions; no statment on
whether criminal, administrative and investigative proceedings were covered; and no
specific coverage of threatened and settled actions.
35. See infra note 47-52 and accompanying text.
36. See Brook, supra note 32, at 3.
37. See generally Johnston, supra note 2; SCHAEFTLER, supra note 2.
38. See supra note 4.
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3
their actions while serving on the board of a corporation9.
Thus, it
was imperative for state legislatures to devise a statutory scheme
which dealt specifically with directors' liability in these many areas
and which provided directors with assurance of their coverage.

The second generation of indemnification statutes are much more
comprehensive in scope and deal more thoroughly with the various
types of potential liability. 0 The majority of these statutes fall into
two categories. The Delaware statute and the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) exemplify the non-exclusive 1 type which provides that the statute is not to preclude any other rights to which
a director may be entitled under by-law, contract or other corporate
agreement. 2 The courts generally agree that other provisions may
be drafted which afford more extensive protection for the director
than specified in the statute, although public policy considerations
would undoubtedly place finite limits upon the extensions.' 3
The second type of indemnification statute, exemplified by the
New York law, is specifically drafted to be the sole right to indemnification for a corporate director, establishing a policy from which
no material deviation is permitted." Corporate management may not
decide to allow indemnification more readily than the statutory provision permits. Further evidence of legislative intent is a subsequent
section of the New York Business Corporation Law"5 stipulating that
no statutory provision shall be valid if in conflict with an explicitly
stated by-law, or other corporate action which may limit the statutory
right to indemnification. Thus, a corporation is free to draft by-laws
containing more stringent indemnification provisions than the statute.
Obviously, there are considerations favoring both types of statute.
The non-exclusive variety, however, presents far greater opportunity
39. See generally Bishop, Indemnification of Corporate Directors, Officers and
Employees, 20 Bus. LAW. 833 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Bishop, Indemnification]; Bishop,
New Cure for an Old Ailment: Insurance Against Directors' and Officers' Liability, 22
Bus. LAW. 92 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Bishop, Old Ailment]; Johnston, supra note 2,
at 2007-09.
40. Johnston, supra note 2, at 1995-96.
41.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(f) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(f) (1974).
These non-exclusivity clauses read, in pertinent part: "[tihe indemnification provided
by this section shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those seeking indemnification may be entitled ....
42. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(f) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(f) (1974).
43. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 1996.
44. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 721 (McKinney 1963).
45. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 726(b)(2) (McKinney 1963).
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for criticism on grounds of being too liberal and not offering sufficient accountability. 6
Within the primary categories of exclusive and non-exclusive, indemnification statutes vary widely in scope. Most statutes can be
classified as mandatory or permissive.47 Mandatory indemnification
statutes confer upon the director a judicially enforceable right to indemnification, providing the director has met the requisite standards
of conduct set forth in the statute.48 If a director has complied with
the required standard of conduct, a court may order an award of indemnity despite the corporation's denial of indemnification to the
director.49 Under permissive indemnification provisions, the corporation is empowered, but not required, to indemnify its directors. 0 If
a. corporation chooses not to indemnify the director, he has no right
to judicial command of the indemnification. The majority of state
statutes currently employ a combination of both mandatory and permissive indemnification provisions addressed to specific circumstances
of the underlying suit. Generally, where the director is "successful
on the merits or otherwise" in a suit, he is entitled to mandatory
indemnification as of right." If, however, the director is unsuccessful
in his defense, the corporation may choose to indemnify him but has
no obligation to do so.52 These classifications provide the basis for
analysis of the various indemnification statutes.
By utilizing the framework of basic categories of indemnification
provisions, it is possible to investigate the application of indemnity
in different forms of lawsuits. A corporate director may incur liability
through either a stockholder derivative suit or third-party action.'
A stockholder derivative suit is an action by or in the right of the
corporation against the director as an individual.' Third-party actions
occur in two distinct situations. Proceedings may be instituted against
a director by a third party for some alleged misconduct in the perfor-

46. See McAdams, supra note 8, at 2140-41.
47. See Note, Court-Ordered Indemnification of Corporate Officers and Directors, 1979 ARIz. ST. L.J. 639, 640-41 [hereinafter cited as Court-OrderedIndemnification].
49. Id. An example of a mandatory indemnification provision is N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW S 725 (McKinney 1963); see infra notes 232-39.
49. See Sebring, supra note 4, at 99-100.
50. McAdams, supra note 8, at 2126.
51. See Johnston, supra note 2.
52. Court-Ordered Indemnification, supra note 47, at 642.
53. Id.
54. See generally Johnston, supra note 2, at 1996.
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mance of his duty to the corporation.55 Alternatively, the third party
may inititate proceedings against the director merely because of his
status as director and not in allegation of any personal misconduct.-6
Due to the nature of the stockholder derivative suit, most modern
indemnification statutes grant much broader indemnity protection in
third-party suits than in derivative actions. This practice is consistent with the weight of public opinion regarding the fiduciary duty
5
of a director toward the corporation. 1
The underlying theory of modern indemnification statutes is that
a director who acts in good faith in furtherance of the corporation's
interests and who incurs liability for violation of some civil or criminal
law is entitled to indemnification.' However, a director who breaches
his fiduciary duty toward the corporation 59 should not be entitled to
indemnification.6 0 In theory, indemnification statutes would seem to
be consistent with the goal of attracting qualified people to serve on
the board of a corporation. In practice, the prospect of indemnification may diminish the fear of liability which normally provides one
of the major incentives for obedience to the law."1 Thus, liberal indemnification provisions may serve to decrease accountability to the
public and increase the possibilities for abuse of corporate power. A
close examination of the specific provisions of the MBCA/Delaware
statute and the New York statute reveals the leniency which exists
in these modern statutes and which may encourage a lax attitude
toward compliance with the law. Indeed, in the words of Justice
Brandeis, the race has not been one of diligence, but of laxity.2
55. See Brook, supra note 32, at 4; SCHAEFTLER, supra note 2, at 15-34.
56. See Brook, supra note 32, at 6.
57. A director owes three basic duties to the corporation he serves: obedience,
diligence and loyalty. The fiduciary relationship of directors to the corporation requires that they act in good faith on all occasions and give to their tasks their conscientious care and best judgment. Because a director owes these various duties to
the corporation, a stockholder derivative suit of the shareholders against the director
mandates the fulfillment of much more stringent standards of conduct before granting
indemnity than a third-party action where the director does not owe such strict duties
to the third party. For a more thorough discussion of a director's fiduciary duties,
see KNEPPER, supra note 2, at 1-7.
58. See generally Bishop, Indemnification, supra note 39.
59. Id.; see also supra note 57.
60. The Business Judgment Rule also serves to afford the director with protection from personal liability for mistakes of business judgment arrived at in good
faith. The Rule may be applied in both shareholder derivative actions and in thirdparty actions. See generally Johnson and Osborne, supra note 1; see also supra note 10.
61. See Bishop, New Trends, supra note 2, at 1087.
62. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933).
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State indemnification statutes differ widely in the latitude given
the corporation deciding whether to indemnify the director. 3 Currently, the New York" and California65 statutes exemplify the more limited
type of indemnification law. The New York statute, effective in 1963,
was an attempt to counteract the recognized overly liberal trend in
prior Delaware corporation law.' The Delaware statute67 and the Model
Business Corporation Act,68 containing virtually identical provisions
with regard to indemnification, exemplify the more liberal law. The
most recent Delaware statute and MBCA were a collaborative effort,
both enacted in 1967, and have served as the prototype for a majority
of the state indemnification provisions.69 Delaware's corporation law
serves to perpetuate the declared public policy of the state which is
"creating a favorable climate" for corporations.0 Although this
favorable climate may have a positive effect upon the Delaware state
treasury,71 the adverse effect upon corporate accountability to the
general public should be of primary concern.
Delaware Statute and Model Business Corporation Act
Since the Delaware statute and MBCA are virtually identical in
their provisions, discussion in this section centers on the MBCA with
acconipanying references to the Delaware statute. The MBCA contains both permissive and mandatory provisions for indemnification.
63. McAdams, supra note 8, at 2126.
64. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 721-26 (McKinney 1963).
65. CALIF. CORP. CODE S 839 (West Supp. 1975).
66. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663, 668-72 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Cary].
67. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145 (1974).
68. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5 (1979).
69. Presently, at least 26 states have indemnification statutes substantially
similar to the MBCA. Only four states currently employ the exclusive type of statute
such as used in New York. Furthermore, a substantial and growing percentage of
corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange are incorporated in Delaware:
as of 1965, 35% of the 1,250 largest were Delaware corporations; in 1973, 40% were
incorporated in Delaware. Cary, supra note 66, at 671.
70. Cary, supra note 66, at 669.
71. Id.; Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware CorporationLaw
of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 861, 862-64 (1969).
72. The text of the MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5 (1979) reads as follows:
(a) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who
was or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened,
pending or completed action, suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal,
administrative or investigative (other than an action by or in the right
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A brief outline of the statutory provisions will aid in analysis of the
entire scheme. The MBCA permits a corporation to indemnify its directors in third-party actions where the director acted in good faith and
of the corporation) by reason of the fact that he is or was a director,
officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the
request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of
another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise,
against expenses (including attorneys' fees), judgments, fines and amounts
paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection
with such action, suit or proceeding if he acted in good faith and in a
manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any criminal action or
proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful.
The termination of any action, suit or proceeding by judgment, order,
settlement, conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent,
shall not, of itself, create a presumption that the person did not act in
good faith and in a manner which he reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any
criminal action or proceeding, had reasonable cause to believe that his
conduct was unlawful.
(b) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who
was or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened,
pending or completed action or suit by or in the right of the corporation
to procure a judgment in its favor by reason of the fact that he is or
was a director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or wVs
serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee
or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other
enterprise against expenses (including attorneys' fees) actually and
reasonably incurred by him in connection with the defense or settlement
of such action or suit if he acted in good faith and in a manner he
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation and except that no indemnification shall be made in respect
of any claim, issue or matter as to which such person shall have been
adjudged to be liable for negligence of misconduct in the performance
of his duty to the corporation unless and only to the extent that the court
in which such action or suit was brought shall determine upon application that, despite the adjudication of liability but in view of all circumstances of the case, such person is fairly and reasonably entitled to
indemnity for such expenses which such court shall deem proper.
(c) To the extent that a director, officer, employee or agent of a
corporation has been successful on the merits or otherwise in defense
of any action, suit or proceeding referred to in subsection (a) or (b), or
in defense of any claim, issue or matter therein, he shall be indemnified
against expenses (including attorney's fees) actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection therewith.
(d) Any indemnification under sections (a) or (b) (unless ordered by
a court) shall be made by the corporation only as authorized in the specific
case upon a determination that indemnification of the director, officer,
emloyee or agent is proper in the circumstances because he has met the
applicable standard of conduct set forth in subsections (a) or (b). Such
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in a manner he reasonably believed to be "in or not opposed to" the
best interests of the corporation." With respect to stockholder
derivative actions, the MBCA permits indemnity under slightly more
determination shall be made (1) by the board of directors by a majority
vote of a quorum consisting of directors who were not parties to such
action, suit or proceeding, or (2) if such a quorum is not obtainable, or,
even if obtainable a quorum of disinterested directors so directs, by independent legal counsel in a written opinion, or (3) by the shareholders.
(e) Expenses (including attorneys' fees) incurred in defending a civil
or criminal action, suit or proceeding may be paid by the corporation in
advance of the final disposition of such action, suit or proceeding may
be paid by the corporation in advance of the final disposition of such action, suit or proceeding as authorized in the manner provided in subsection (d) upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of the director,
officer, employee or agent to repay such amount unless it shall ultimately
be determined that he is entitled to be indemnified by the corporation
as authorized in this section.
(f) The indemnification provided by this section shall not be deemed
exclusive of any other rights to which those indemnified may be entitled
under any by-law, agreement, vote of shareholders or disinterested directors or otherwise, both as to action in his official capacity and as to action in another capacity while holding such office, and shall continue as
to a person who has ceased to be a director, officer, employee or agent
and shall inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors and administrators
of such a person.
(g) A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of any person who is or was a director, officer, employee
or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the
corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise against any liability asserted against him and incurred by him in any such capacity or
arising out of his status as such, whether or not the corporation would
have the power to indemnify him against such liability under the provisions of this section.
The Delaware indemnification statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5 145, is identical
in substance to the MBCA with the addition of subsection (h), which reads as follows:
(h) For the purposes of this section, references to the "corporation"
shall include, in addition to the resulting corporation, any constituent corporation (including any constituent of a constituent) absorbed in a consolidation or merger which, if its separate existence had continued, would
have had power and authority to indemnify its directors, officers, and
employees or agents, so that any person who is or was a director, officer,
employee or agent of such constituent corporation, or is or was serving
at the request of such constituent corporation as a director, officer,
employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust
or other enterprise, shall stand in the same position under the provisions
of this section with respect to the resulting or surviving corporation as
he would have with respect to such constituent corporation if its separate
existence had continued.
73. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(a) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(a) (1974).
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restricted circumstances. ' Mandatory indemnification is provided
against expenses actually and reasonably incurred by a director to
the extent that he has been "successful on the merits or otherwise"
in defense of any third-party or derivative suit."5 Permissive indemnification may be awarded, however, only after a determination is
made that the director has met the requisite standard of conduct. 8
The determination may be properly made by: (1) a quorum of
disinterested directors, or (2) independent legal counsel at the request
of a quorum of disintersted directors, or (3) majority vote of the
shareholders." The MBCA allows advancement of expenses upon an
"undertaking" by a director to repay the amount in the event he is
found not entitled to indemnity." The MBCA is non-exclusive, meaning that the statutory rights to indemnification are not inclusive of
other rights to indemnification which the director may be entitled to
under by-law, charter, or contract.79 Finally, the MBCA establishes
the right of the corporation to purchase insurance on behalf of the
director regardless of whether or not the corporation has the power
to indemnify him under the statutory scheme."0
Subsection 5(a) of the MBCA governs indemnification in thirdparty suits. Any threatened, pending or completed action whether civil,
criminal, administrative or investigative where the director is being
sued may be a situation where indemnity is permitted." The requisite
standard of conduct for allowance of indemnification in civil actions
is defined in two parts. First, the director must have acted in good
faith. 2 Good faith requires that the director be bound by traditional
notions of fairness, loyalty and honesty when acting in his capacity
on the board. Good faith has been interpreted to mean the same care
that a reasonably prudent person in a position on the board would
exercise.' Alternatively, good faith in some jurisdictions requires the
higher standard of care that a reasonable and prudent person would
exercise in his own business affairs.' The exact definition is not clear.
Second, the director must have acted in a manner he reasonably

74.
75.
76.

MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(b) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,

77.

Id.

78.
80.
81.

MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(e) (1979);
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(f) (1979);
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(g) (1979);
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(a) (1979);

82.
83.
84.

See supra note 81.
See KNEPPER, supra note 2, at 79-81.
Id.

79.

MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S

5(c) (1979);

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,

MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(d) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
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5 145(d) (1974).

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(e) (1974).
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DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5 145(g) (1974).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5 145(a) (1974).
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believed to be "in or not opposed to" the best interests of the
corporation.85 Although the best interests of the corporation are
sometimes difficult to ascertain, the director must have acted in a
manner he reasonably believed to be beneficial or neutral to the corporation. For a criminal proceeding, the applicable standard requires
that the director have had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct
was unlawful. The language of this section has been the subject of
much controversy.'
The clause, "in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation" is ambiguous and has been defined in several ways," some
definitions being reasonable, and some unjustifiable. Very few jurisdictions employ this terminology. By using the phrase, the MBCA arguably allows permissive indemnification under a less stringent standard of conduct than required by the vast majority of states.8 The
rationale advanced by drafters of the MBCA for including the phrase
was that under early statutes a director's right to indemnity, when
sued simply in his status as a director, was unclear." Thus, this
statutory construction was employed in an attempt to provide for indemnity when the director's alleged liability rests solely on his status
as director. However, alternative interpretations of this phrase have
been proposed, rendering the meaning of this section uncertain at best.
The phrase "in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation" as the requisite standard of conduct for indemnity in civil
actions does not accomplish the desired clarification with respect to
status claims against directors.' The phrase "not opposed to" is subject to a legitimate interpretation which encompasses situations in
which the director may be personally involved but reasonably believes
that the corporation has no interest in the transaction. An example
of this situation would be the director who purchases stock or a
business operation for his personal account, reasonably believing that
the corporation has no interest in the transaction. If this director is
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 5(a) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(a) (1974).
86. See generally McAdams, supra note 8, at 2132, 2133; Bishop, New Trenws,
supra note 2; Johnston, supra note 2.
87. By 1980 all states except Delaware (and the MBCA) had omitted the clause
permitting indemnification when actions were "not opposed to" the best interests of
the corporation.
88. See Sebring, supra note 4, at 102; McAdams, supra note 8, at 2132; Bishop,
New Trends, supra note 2, at 1082.
89. See supra note 88.
90. McAdams, supra note 8, at 2132-33; Brook, supra note 32, at 8.
91. See Arsht and Stapleton, Delaware'sNew General CorporationLaw: Substantive Changes, 23 Bus. LAw. 75, 78-79 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Arsht and Stapleton].

85.
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sued for alleged diversion to himself of a corporate opportunity, the
current wording of this section would permit indemnity upon a finding
of his good faith pursuant to the statutory requirements.' Under these
circumstances the wording is a desired improvement over previous
statutory provisions.9" Here, the phrase allows indemnity for a director who meets the required standard of conduct when he is sued merely because of his status as director. However, the phrase has also
been interpreted differently to allow indemnity in situations where
the director is alleged to have been trading company stock for his
own account,94 in violation of his fiduciary duty toward the corporation. Such a violation of fiduciary duty is an abuse of power falling
outside the intended scope of the statutory phrase. Thus, if this phrase
of the statutory provision is allowed to stand, the express purpose
for including the phrase is violated.
In addition to ambiguity in the meaning of the phrase "or not
opposed to," inconsistency also exists between the two parts of the
standard of conduct whereby the director must have acted in good
faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed
to the corporation's best interests. It would seem extremely difficult
to make an honest determination of the director's good faith where
his belief was no more affirmative than that he reasonably thought
his actions to be "not opposed to" the best interests of the corporation.' Thus, this phrase of MBCA S 5(a), because of inherent ambiguity, is detrimental to the standard of conduct required to allow
indemnity of a director in civil actions.
The second area of confusion found in subsection 5(a) of the
MBCA is the allowance of indemnity for amounts paid in settlement
of actions against the director.99 Indemnification for amounts an accused director may pay in settlement of an action against him could
be viewed as encouraging directors to effectuate settlement rather
than risk an adjudication of guilt." The concern in this context is expressed in terms of the unhealthy consequences which must surely

92. Id.
93. McAdams, supra note 8, at 2132.
94. Sebring, supra note 4, at 102.
95. See generally Bishop, New Trends, supra note 2; McAdams, supra note
8, at 2132.
96. Johnston, supra note 2, at 1997.
97. Brook, supra note 32, at 9.
98. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(a) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(a) (1974).
99. See generally Arsht and Stapleton, supra note 91, at 103; Bishop, New
Trends, supra note 2, at 1082-83.
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result when a director is placed in a position of assured indemnity
if he settles prior to judgment but risks paying his own bills if he
unsuccessfully resists the action.' 0 Payment of indemnity for settlements in stockholder derivative suits has long been forbidden
because of the circuity of the payment.'' Since a stockholder derivative
suit is actually a suit by the stockholders on behalf of the corporate
entity against the director as an individual, an allowance of indemnity
for a settlement would defeat the purpose of the action by reimbursing the director for the amount paid in settlement from corporate
funds. Thus, indemnification for amounts paid in settlement of a
derivative suit is not allowed because of the desire to avoid encouraging settlement and because of the circuity of payment.
Applying the same rationale advanced to forbid indemnity in
settled derivative actions to the situation of third-party suits compels the same conclusion. In the past, indemnification for settlements
in third-party actions has been allowed because of the desire to avoid
adverse publicity,' 2 reduce the total cost actually paid by the corporation,' 3 and decrease time spent in litigation. Despite these valid considerations, however, the fact remains that it is no more desirable
to encourage compromise settlement through assurance of indemnity
in third-party actions than in derivative suits. Since a settlement produces no determination of the propriety of the director's conduct
before an award of indemnity is made, there is no apparent justification of indemnification for amounts paid in settling third-party actions.
Furthermore, where the MBCA contains no requirement of judicial
approval of indemnification in connection with a settlement,' 4 the
danger to society is clear. The standard of conduct requires merely
actions "not opposed to the best interests of the corporation" and indemnity may be granted without court approval of the award.
Under this statutory scheme a director who has breached his
fiduciary duty might be granted indemnification by the corporation.
Such a result is contrary to the goal of maximizing accountability of
corporations to the public. Understandably, a director faced with the
choice between an assurance of indemnity for a settlement and risking personal assumption of the costs of litigation would choose to settle the action, if there were any chance of a judicial finding of misconduct. Therefore, statutory allowance of indemnity in settled third-party
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Bishop, New Trends, supra note 2, at 1083.
Arsht and Stapleton, supra note 91, at 103.
See Court-Ordered Indemnification, supra note 47, at 645.
Id.
Bishop, New Trends, supra note 2, at 1083.
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actions may encourage termination of suits by settlement where there
should be a more thorough determination of the propriety of the directors' actions to insure proper use of corporate power.
Although subsection 5(b), which pertains to stockholder derivative
actions, is drafted more narrowly than subsection 5(a), ambiguity does
exist which allows laxity in application of the provision. Section 5(b)
contains the same problematic terminology of section 5(a) with regard
to the requisite standard of conduct.0 5 A director may be entitled to
indemnification if he. acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably
believed to be "in or not opposed to" the best interests of the
corporation." 6 The stated exception is that no indemnity shall be
awarded where the director is adjudged liable for negligence or misconduct in performance of his duty toward the corporation. 10' However,
the statute later provides that the court may, upon application by
the director, find him entitled to indemnity for expenses in light of
all the circumstances of the case, despite an adjudication of liability
for negligence or misconduct."8 Results under this statutory scheme
are highly problematic.
The phrase "or not opposed to" the best interests of the corporation arguably becomes even more offensive when applied to stockholder derivative suits under section 5(b). Because of the nature of
the derivative suit, the need to avoid indemnification in situations of
alleged breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation is particularly acute.
Where the director is being sued by a shareholding member of the
corporation for alleged misconduct, his actions should be above
reproach before enabling a grant of indemnity. An affirmative standard of conduct requiring actions in the corporation's best interests
would achieve this end. A less affirmative "or not opposed to" standard encompasses conduct not readily justifiable as deserving of indemnity. An extension of the rationale in opposition to use of this
phrase with regard to third-party actions to include stockholder
derivative actions compels the same conclusion.
Although the drafters' intended purpose for inclusion of the
phrase to cover status suits against directors' 9 is justifiable, the ambiguity of the phrase renders it open to other interpretations unforeseen by the drafters of the MBCA. There is no indication in the statute

105.
106.
107.

108.
109.

5(b) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(b) (1974).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(b) (1974).
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
5(b) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(b) (1974).
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT 5(b) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(b) (1974).
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5 (1979); Model Comments 1 2, at 219.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
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that the lesser standard is not equally applicable to non-status claims. "'
To allow possible indemnity under this section where there has been
a breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation violates the purpose of
the derivative suit. It would also appear extremely difficult to fulfill
the good faith requirement of the standard of conduct in a derivative
suit where the director's belief was merely that his actions were "not
opposed to" the corporation's best interests."' The standard of good
faith implies more affirmative conduct than actions merely "not opposed to" the best interests of the corporation. Thus, the standard
of conduct established in subsection 5(b) for directors being sued in
a stockholder derivative suit is ambiguous and too lenient to ensure
directors' integrity and adequately protect shareholders and society
from abuses of corporate power.
Another area in which MBCA subsection 5(b) proves lenient in
providing for indemnification of directors is found in the last clause
of the section. In that provision a director may obtain indemnity for
expenses notwithstanding an adjudication of liability if the court determines him to be reasonably and fairly entitled to such indemnity." 2
This statutory provision was reiterated in the case of Wisener v. Air
Express Int'l Corp.,"3 wherein the court stated that "[tihere is little
doubt that a corporation may commit itself to indemnify its officers
and directors for litigation expenses incurred in defending against
liability for actions taken in carrying out corporate responsibilities,
even though negligent, if the corporation finds it in the corporate interest to undertake such a commitment.". In Wisener, indemnification was allowed"' under the Illinois law which is substantially identical to the MBCA with regard to indemnification. It is difficult to
imagine many situations in which a court would allow indemnity after
a finding of liability. It has been suggested that one such situation
might be where the court is newly establishing a stricter standard
which the director could not have reasonably anticipated."' However,

110.
111.

Brook, supra note 32, at 9.
Id.

112.

MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(b) (1979).

113. 583 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1978).
114. Id. at 581.
115. In the trial court, relief was denied Wisener on grounds that under the
then effective statute and by-laws, negligence was a bar to recovery. Wisener had
been found guilty of negligence with regard to accounting figures used in the aborted
merger. The appellate court reversed and applied the new Illinois statute retroactively
to allow indemnification from the corporation for legal fees and expenses.
116. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 1997; Arsht and Stapleton, supra note 91,
at 79.
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the existence of this clause creates opportunities for abuse and broad
interpretation contrary to the intended purpose, as evidenced in the
Wisener decision. In an era demanding greater corporate accountability
to society, public policy dictates that indemnification should not be
allowed after an adjudication of liability upon the director.
The MBCA provides in subsection 5(c) for absolute indemnification as of right when the director has been "successful on the merits
or otherwise"'17 in defense of either a stockholder derivative suit or
third-party action. What constitutes success under this standard is
subject to differing interpretation.'18 Meeting the conduct requirement
under certain interpretations of the statute does not always render
the director worthy of indemnity. The difficulty of ascertaining the
proper meaning of this section is aggravated by the use of the clause
"to the extent that . . ." a director is successful "in defense of any
claim, issue or matter therein" he shall be indemnified against
expenses." 9 Considered as a whole, this subsection allows for partial
indemnification of the director who is partially successful in his
defense, with success being defined to include various technical dispositions of the suit. "Success on the merits or otherwise"'" has been
clarified and defined in two recent decisions.
Extensive litigation between Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corporation (MCS)"2' and Louis Wolfson" during the late 1960's and early
1970's is illustrative of the tendency toward more liberal interpretation of' indemnification provisions in recent years. The substantive
issue involved in these cases was alleged criminal violation of federal
securities laws. In 1966 a federal grand jury in the Southern District
of New York returned a five-count indictment against defendants
Wolfson, Gerbert, Kosow and Staub; all prominent figures in the
management of MCS and its subsidiary." The claimants were charged
with various violations of federal securities laws." 4 At the conclusion
of the criminal trial in 1968, the defendants were convicted on all five
S 5(c) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(c) (1974).
Arsht and Stapleton, supra note 91, at 79.
119. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(c) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(c) (1974).
See generally Arsht and Stapleton, supra note 91, at 80.
120. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(c) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(c) (1974).
121. [hereinafter cited as MCS].
122. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 264 A.2d 358 (Del. Super. Ct.
1970); Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
123. See Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 264 A.2d 358, 359 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1970).
124. See Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 140 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1974).
117.

MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT

118.
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counts of the indictment. These convictions were later reversed,"n and
in each of two retrials, the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Subsequently, the charges were settled as follows: Wolfson entered a plea
of nolo contendere'l to count five, and the other charges against him
were dropped. He was fined $10,000 and issued a suspended sentence
of eighteen months. Gerbert agreed not to appeal his conviction on
count three, and the other charges against him were dropped. He was
fined $2,000 and received an eighteen month suspended sentence. The
prosecution also dropped all charges against Kosow and Staub.'
Wolfson and Gerbert then sought indemnification under section
145(c) of the Delaware Act, for the expenses they incurred in defending the counts which were eventually dropped.2" The court in MerrittChapman & Scott v. Wolfson held that the defendants had not achieved
"success on the merits or otherwise" under the meaning of the statute
and were therefore not entitled to indemnification for their expenses."
The initial finding of guilt on all counts against the defendants was
never fully rebutted. Despite reversal of the convictions, lack of consensus among subsequent jury members and eventual partial settlement on the charges led the Delaware court to deny the right of
indemnification to Wolfson and Gerbert.M
A denial of indemnity in the Wolfson case was undoubtedly the
proper result. However, four years later the Superior Court of
Delaware reversed the lower court's decision and granted partial
indemnity.' The reversal was a departure from the definition of success as established in previous cases.13 1 In granting the partial indemnity, the Delaware court observed that success in a criminal action
125. See U.S. v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1970).
126. Although a plea of nolo contendere may not be used as an admission in
another action, upon acceptance by the court and imposition of a sentence, there is
a judgment of conviction against the defendant. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, 32(b).
127. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 140 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1974).
128. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 264 A.2d 358, 360 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1970).
129. Id.
130. The court's opinion denying indemnification to Wolfson and Gerbert was
concluded by these guiding words: "It would be anomalous, indeed, and diametrically
opposed to the spirit and purpose of the statute and sound public policy to extend
the benefits of indemnification to these defendants under the facts and circumstances
of this case." Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 264 A.2d 358, 360 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1970). See also Galdi v. Berg, 359 F. Supp. 698, 701 (D. Del. 1973).
131. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138 (Del. Super. Ct.
1974).
132. McAdams, supra note 8, at 2135.
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must be considered as anything other than conviction." By allowing
indemnification under these circumstances, the court was establishing
a broad interpretation of the statutory language, in abuse of the public
trust.
In deciding to award indemnity in this situation, the court enabled
future awards of indemnification where a suit is terminated for merely
technical reasons, such as the running of time limitations. The
Delaware court failed to recognize that, although a "successful" defendant may avoid conviction for a variety of reasons, he may not be
deserving of indemnification in light of the policies underlying the
practice.1" Because subsection 5(c) provides for mandatory indemnification, unlike subsections 5(a) and 5(b) which are permissive, there is
no requirement for an impartial entity to ascertain whether minimum
standards of conduct have been met. The sole criterion for an award
of mandatory indemnification is the success standard defined so liberally in the statute. By implication, the MBCA provides that the director need not satisfy a requisite standard of conduct so long as he
meets the success standard.1 The provision for mandatory indemnification as set forth in MBCA subsection 5(c), allowing partial indemnity
under a loosely construed definition of success, is too liberal and
violates the corporation's duty to society by awarding indemnity to
undeserving directors. Furthermore, allowing for broad latitude in
judicial discretion permits the possibility of increasingly liberal interpretations of the "success" criterion until there may exist no real standard at all.
The increasingly liberal interpretation of "success" is further
evidenced in a more recent decision 1" under the Illinois indemnification statute which is patterned after the MBCA'13 In 1978, the Sec-

133. In granting partial indemnity to Wolfson and Gerbert, the Delaware court
observed:
The statute requires indemnification to the extent that the claimant has
been "successful on the merits or otherwise." Success is vindication. In
a criminal action, any result other than conviction must be considered
success. . . . The statute does not require complete success. It provides
for indemnification to the extent of success "in defense of any claim, issue
or matter" in an action. Claimants are therefore entitled to partial indemnification if successful on a count of an indictment, which is an independent criminal charge, even if unsuccessful on another, related count.
Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 141 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
134. McAdams, supra note 8, at 2135.
135. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT . 5(c) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(c) (1974).
136. Wisener v. Air Express International Corp., 583 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1979).
137. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32 S 157.42.12 (1977).
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ond Circuit'38 followed the lead of the Delaware Superior Court by
holding in Wisener v. Air Express Int'l Corp. that a settlement for
no liability and no payment on a third-party claim constituted "success on the merits or otherwise.""3 Wisener had been president, director, and chairman of the board of Air Express International Corporation (AEI) during an aborted merger with the Novo Corporation. The
merger negotiations ended abruptly when Novo discovered huge discrepancies between the unaudited income figures supplied to them
by AEI and the actual figures." A number of claims and cross-claims
ensued alleging fraud and violation of securities law, some charging
Wisener personally.' More specifically, Wisener was charged with
negligence for permitting Novo to rely on the figures during merger
negotiations when he knew or should have known of severe deficienBefore trial began, all the
cies in the accounting system of AEI.
actions were settled and withdrawn except for Wisener's claim for
indemnity. The court awarded indemnity under the mandatory provision of the Illinois statute and held that a settlement for no liability
fit the statutory requirement for "success on the merits or
otherwise."'4 From examination of both Wolfson and Wisener,'" it is
apparent that courts are now opting to allow indemnification of directors without a showing of meeting high standards of conduct which
the public demands from these corporate leaders. Because of the
tendency toward extremely liberal interpretation of loosely constructed
statutory provisions, there must be revision of the statutes and a more
conservative approach taken to the mandatory indemnification provions of the MBCA and its progeny.
138. The case was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York and decided under Illinois law because Air Express International Corp. is an Illinois corporation.
139. Wisener v. Air Express International Corp., 583 F.2d 579, 583 (2d Cir. 1979).
140. Id. at 581.
141. Id.
142. Id. Wisener had received reports along with audits from the Arthur Anderson Company noting the discrepancies and had been warned by AEI employees that
variances were surfacing.
143. Id. at 583. The court awarded indemnity by retroactively applying the
liberal statute and by-law to Wisener's actions which occurred prior to enactment of
either provision but which had come into effect during the pendency of his suit for
indemnity.
144. For court decisions achieving the same result, see B & B Investment Club
v. Kleinert's, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1979). An individual defendant who
negotiated a dismissal with prejudice for alleged violation of federal securities laws
in connection with an offering of stock without making any payment to plaintiff class,
was "successful on the merits or otherwise" within the meaning of the Pennsylvania
statute and was therefore entitled to indemnity. See uilso Goldstein v. Alodex Corp.,
409 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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The inadequacies so apparent in the initial sections of the MBCA
are compounded in subsection 5(d). In subsection 5(d) of the MBCA,
procedures are established which must be followed before granting
permissive indemnification under subsections 5(a) and 5(b). Authorization for indemnity under the permissive sections of the statute is given
after a determination has been made that indemnification is proper
because the applicable standard of conduct has been met by the director. This determination must be made: "(1) by the board of directors
by a majority vote of a quorum consisting of directors who were not
parties to such action, suit or proceeding, or (2) if such a quorum is
not obtainable, or, even if obtainable, a quorum of disinterested directors so directs, by independent legal counsel in a written opinion, or
(3) by the shareholders." ' The requirement of an impartial entity to
determine the propriety of permissive indemnification in a given situation is commendable. However, the entities designated by the statute
cannot be guaranteed impartial to the extent necessary for the administration of justice.
Considering the realities of the corporate world, those appointed
in the statute to determine a proper allowance of indemnification are
not sufficiently impartial to equitably render a decision. Most
derivative stits name all directors as parties to the suit, which places
1
the determination in the hands of "independent legal counsel.""
'
However, some question remains as to what constitutes "independent"
for these purposes. The Ohio statute explicitly provides that "an attorney, or a firm having associated with it an attorney, who has been
retained by or who has performed services for the corporation, or
any person to be indemnified within the past five years" is not independent."' Ohio's statute further specifies that any determination made
by either the disinterested directors or independent legal counsel "shall
be promptly communicated to the person who threatened or brought
the action or suit . . . and within ten days after receipt of such notification, such person shall have the right to petition a court to review
the reasonableness of such determination."" 9 These limitations seem

145.
146.

MODEL BuSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(d) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(d) (1974).
MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT S 5(d) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(d) (1974).

147. Bishop, New Trends, supra note 2, at 1083. Because of the nature of a
derivative suit, the shareholders certainly could not make the determination under
such circumstances.
148. PAGE'S OHIO REVISED CODE S 1701.13(E)(4) (1976 Supp.). Also, the California
statute entirely omits the possibility of opinion by independent legal counsel. See
CALIF. CODE ANN. S 317(e) (West's 1977).
149. PAGE'S OHIO REVISED CODE S 1701.13(E)(4) (1976 Supp.).
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desirable in the interest of ensuring an equitable and impartial determination of the propriety of indemnification.
As the MBCA subsection 5(d) now stands, there are no limitations expressed. The present definition of "independent legal counsel"
is so vague that the disinterested directors might hire the regular
outside counsel of the corporation to make the indemnity determination. 1" Regular corporate counsel could easily be friends and
associates of defendants in the case.' 5' Obviously, close associates or
even legal counsel indebted to the corporation for its retainer 52' will
not be the impartial entity required to make the determination for
or against granting indemnity. In the event that the deciding entity
is comprised of colleagues of the accused director, there is little doubt
that one of two situations will more than likely occur. Either the directors not named as parties to the suit will be lenient in judging the
actions of their peers seeking indemnity," or, when a quorum of unaccused directors face an agent who has been acquitted, indemnity may
be denied to the innocent director because of a change in membership on the board.' In either case, the resulting decision may not
be proper under the circumstances.
By revising the statutes to preclude such unwanted actions as
using the corporation's usual outside counsel or "disinterested" directors to opine on permissive indemnity, it may be possible to achieve
a more impartial determination on the issue of indemnification. 55' Provisions such as those employed by the Ohio legislature would properly define the requisite limitations which should exist under the MBCA
subsection 5(d).
Despite vague and ambiguous draftsmanship which results in lenient application of the foregoing sections to permissive and mandatory
indemnification of directors, the alleged intent of the draftsmen of
the MBCA was to restrain management's power to protect itself from
personal liability." However, the entire foundation for the indemnification provisions is subverted when subsections (f) and (g) are introduced

150. McAdams, supra note 8, at 2139.
151. Id. See also Johnston, supra note 2, at 1998.
152. Bishop, New Problems in Indemnifying and Insuring Directors:Protection
Against Liability Under the Federal Securities Law, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1158
[hereinafter cited as Bishop, Protection].
153. Sebring, supra note 4, at 100.
154. Bishop, New Trends, supra note 2.
155.
Id. at 1084, 1085.
156. Id.
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into the statutory scheme. These subsections suggest, instead, a legislative desire to permit indemnification either directly or through the
use of insurance, in virtually all circumstances. 57'
Subsection 5(f), which provides that the indemnity possible under
the statutory scheme is not exclusive of any other right to indemnification, embodies the very core of the difficulties inherent in the
MBCA's indemnification provisions. Under the nonexclusivity clause,
the corporation is empowered with the freedom to draft provisions
in the articles of incorporation, by-laws, or even a contract, providing
for broader indemnification than allowable under the statute.'5 The
intent of the draftsmen of the MBCA is that "other rights to indemnification may still exist . . . within such limits of public policy .as
the courts may establish." 5 ' Further, courts will be guided by "public
policy considerations, possibly in light of the substantive provisions
of the statute" in construing and considering enforcement of a corporate action which extends coverage beyond the statute's scope. 6'
Traditionally, this construction has been the case. Courts in the
past have been reluctant to validate a by-law allowing indemnity for
a director who acted in dereliction of his fiduciary duty toward the
corporation,"' or whose innocence was doubtful. However, in recent
years courts have been more willing to allow indemnification under
broadly constructed by-laws, charter provisions and contracts.' Frequently, the policy rationale advanced by MBCA drafters and the early
courts which undergirds the indemnification statute has not been met.
For example, a corporate by-law providing indemnity to a director
who is required to act only in a manner not absolutely contrary to
157. Although the extent of such other indemnity provisions may be limited
by public policy, a broader remedy has been found allowable. Mooney v. Willys-Overland
Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1953).
158. Sebring, supra note 4, at 107-09.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1963); Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 182 A.2d 647 (Del. Ch. 1962).
161. See Galdi v. Berg, 359 F. Supp. 698 (D. Del. 1973); Globus v. Law Research
Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afI'd in part, rev'd in part, 418 F.2d
1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Feit v. Data Processing Equip.
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
162. Although technically the corporation purchases the insurance, sometimes
the corporation pays 90% and the individual director must pay 10% of the premiums.
Arguably, this procedure renders the idea of indemnity insurance more palatable. For
further discussion of this area, see generally, Bishop, Old Ailment, supra note 39. Also,
the scope of this note necessarily limits discussion of this topic to a cursory examination of the primary concepts involved as they relate to indemnification provisions in
corporation statutes.
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the best interests of the corporation may, conceivably, be found valid.
This would enable a grant of indemnity to one who has not acted
in a manner worthy of indemnification from a policy standpoint. This
problem of subversion of the public policy of the MBCA is further
complicated by the use of D & 0 insurance.
Subsection 5(g) empowers the corporation to purchase" 3 directors' and officers' liability insurance against any liability asserted
against a director "whether or not the corporation would have the
power to indemnify him against such liability under the provisions
of this section."" D & 0 insurance policies have been heavily
criticized." MBCA subsection 5(g) appears to allow the directors of
a corporation to "relieve themselves at the company's expense of any
legal obligation to manage the corporation's affairs with either honesty
(provided that they steer clear of the penal code) or diligence."'66 Commentators holding this view often argue that insurance for deliberate
misconduct, which is not violative of criminal statutes, undermines
the essential deterrent function of the imposition of civil liability.'67
Thus, they object to the principle of allowing the purchase of broad
coverage insurance. This viewpoint is aptly summarized by a leading
commentator when he states, "[slo long as the law imposes on directors duties of good faith and due care, it should not permit them to
evade those duties through the device of insurance purchased by the
corporation."' 68
Proponents of the converse argument would seem to tolerate
broad D & 0 insurance on the grounds that the criminal law serves
the essential deterrent function and insurance for civil liability serves
primarily to ensure full compensation for the victim."9 Once the distinction has been made between coverage for compensatory civil damages
versus punitive criminal damages, the propreity of D & 0 insurance
can be maintained. D & 0 indemnification insurance is not intended
to extend to coverage of punitive damages. 70 Rather, the insurance
provides for payment of compensatory damages and the costs of
defense, subject to explicitly stated exclusion clauses which bring D

163.
164.

S 145(g) (1974).
See Bishop, New Trends, supra note 2, at 1086-1088, quoting the MODEL
BusINESS CORP. ACT S 5(g) (1979).
165. Id. at 1086.
166. Id. at 1087.
167. Id. at 1091.
168. Id.
169. Brook, supra note 32, at 23-29.
170. Id. at 25.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(g) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
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& 0 insurance well within the limits of public policy. 171 Also, the nature

of insurance allows for dispersion of the costs over a large number
of people, and, ultimately, only a few directors will avail themselves
of the coverage. Further, to the extent that insurance lessens and
liquidates what could be an expensive and uncertain claim, it permits
better financial planning by the corporation and guarantees recovery
to the plaintiff.m Thus, the debate over the propriety of D & 0 liability
insurance continues, with no definitive argument for either side.
Although an improvement over the early type of indemnification statutes, comprehensive indemnification provisions as found in
the MBCA and its progeny are in many ways vague and ambiguous.
Lack of clarity, coupled with a certain ideological leniency inherent
in the statutes, has led to increasingly liberal interpretations and application of the provisions in recent years, as evidenced in the Wolfson
and Wisener decisions. The effect of this type of statute has been
to decrease corporate accountability to the public in an era when society seems to demand more stringent, rather than more lenient, controls over powerful corporations. Thus, there is a recognized need to
alter the statutory scheme to re-align it with values apparent in today's society. In furtherance of this objective, several states, such as
New York, are attempting to utilize more conservative indemnification statutes. A comparative analysis of the New York statute in terms
of the MBCA confirms that the New York-type statute is preferable
in many respects.
New York Statute
The revised New York Business Corporation Law's (BCL) indemnification statute,' 3 which places strict limitations on the freedom of
171.
172.

Johnston, supra note 2, at 2000.
Heyler,. Indemnification of CorporateAgents, 23 U.C.L.A. L.

REV.

1255, 1265

(1976).
173. The pertinent part of N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW SS 721-27 (McKinney 1963 and
Supp. 1981) reads as follows:
S 721. Exclusivity of statutory provisionsfor indemnification of direc-

tors and officers.
No provisions made to indemnify directors or officers for the defense of
any civil or criminal action or proceeding, whether contained in the certificate of incorporation, the by-laws, a resolution of shareholders or directors, an agreement or otherwise, nor any award of indemnification by
a court, shall be valid unless consistent with this article. Nothing contained
in this article shall affect any rights to indemnification to which corporate
personnel other than directors and officers may be entitled by contract
or otherwise under law. L.1961, c. 855, eff. Sept. 1, 1963.
S 722. Authorizationfor indemnification of directors and officers in
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management to indemnify itself, is much less prevalent among state
actions by or in the right of a corporation to procure a judgment in its favor.
(a) A corporation may indemnify any person, made a party to an action
by or in the right of the corporation to procure a judgment in its favor
by reason of the fact that he, his testator or intestate, is or was a director or officer of the corporation, against the reasonable expenses, including
attorneys' fees, actually and necessarily incurred by him in connection
with the defense of such action, or in connection with an appeal therein,
except in relation to matters as to which such director or officer is adjudged to have breached his duty to the corporation under S 717. (Duty
of directors) or under (h) of S 715 (Officers). As amended L.1977, c. 432, S 6.
(b) The indemnification authorized under paragraph (a) shall in no case
include: (1) Amounts paid in settling or otherwise disposing of a threatened
action, or a pending action with or without court approval, or (2) Expenses
incurred in defending a threatened action, or a pending action which is
settled or otherwise disposed of without court approval. L.1961, c.855;
as amended L.1962, c.819, S 2, both eff. Sept. 1, 1963.
S 723. Authorization for indemnification of directors and officers in
actions or proceedings other than by or in the right of a corporation to procure a judgment in its favor.
(a) A corporation may indemnify any person, made, or threatened to be
made, a party to an action or proceeding other than one by or in the
right of the corporation to procure a judgment in its favor, whether civil
or criminal, including an action by or in the right of any other corporation of any type or kind, domestic or foreign, or any partnership, joint
venture, trust, employee benefit plan or other enterprise, which any director or officer of the corporation served in any capacity at the request
of the corporation, by reason of the fact that he, his testator or intestate,
was a director or officer of the corporation, or served such other corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, employee benefit plan or other enterprise in any capacity, against judgments, fines, amounts paid in settlement and reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees actually and
necessarily incurred as a result of such action or proceeding, or any appeal therein, if such director or officer acted, in good faith, for a purpose
which he reasonably believe to be in, or for, in the case of service for
any other corporation of any partnership, joint venture, trust, employee
benefit plan or other enterprise, not opposed to, the best interest of the
corporation and, in criminal actions or proceedings, in addition, have no
reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful.
(b) The termination of any such civil or criminal action or proceeding by
judgment, settlement, conviction or upon a plea of nolo contendere, or
its equivalent, shall not in itself create a presumption that any such director
or officer did not act, in good faith, for a purpose which he reasonably
believed to be in, or, in the case of service for any other corporation or
any partnership, joint venture, trust, employee benefit plan or other enterprise, not opposed to, the best interest of the corporation or that he had
reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful.
(c) For the purpose of this section, a corporation shall be deemed to have
requested a person to serve an employee benefit plan where the performance by such person of his duties to the corporation also imposes duties
on, or otherwise involves services by, such person to the plan or par-
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ticipants or beneficiaries of the plan; excise taxes assessed on a person
with respect to the employee benefit plan pursuant to applicable laws
shall be considered fines; and action taken or omitted by a person with
respect to an employee benefit plan in the performance of such person's
duties for a purpose reasonably believed by such person to be in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries of a plan shall be deemed to
be for a purpose which is not opposed to the best interest of the corporation. As amended L.1977, c.299, S 1.
S 724. Payment of indemnification other than by court award.
(a) A person who has been wholly successful, on the merits or otherwise,
in the defense of a civil or criminal action or proceedings of the character
described in S 722 . . . or S 723 . . . shall be entitled to indemnification
as authorized in such sections.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (a), any indemnification under sections 722 and 723, unless ordered by a court under section 725 ... shall
be made by the corporation, only if authorized in a specific case: (1) By
the board acting as a quorum consisting of directors who are not parties
to such action or proceedings upon a finding that the director or officer
has met the standad of conduct set forth in section 722 or 723, as the
case may be, or, (2) If a quorum under subparagraph (1) is not obtainable
with due diligence; (A) By the board upon the opinion in writing of independent legal counsel that indemnification is proper in the circumstances
because the applicable standard of conduct set forth in such section has
been met by such director or officer, or (B) By the shareholders upon
a finding that director or officer has met the applicable standard of conduct set forth in such section.
(c) Expenses incurred in defending a civil or criminal action of proceeding
may be paid by the corporation in advance of the final disposition of such
action or proceeding if authorized under paragraph (b).
S 725. Indemnification of directors and officers by a court.
(a) Notwithstanding the failure of a corporation to provide indemnification, and despite any contrary resolution of the board or of the shareholders
in the specific case under section 724 . . . indemnification shall be awarded
by a court to the extent authorized under section 722 ... , 723 ... , and
paragraph (a) of section 724. Application therefore may be made, in every
case, either: (1) In the civil action or proceeding in which the expenses
were incurred or other amounts were paid, or (2) to the Supreme Court
in a separate proceeding, in which case the application shall set forth the
disposition of any previous application made to any court for the same
or similar relief and also reasonable costs for the failure to make application for such relief in the action or proceeding in which the expenses
were incurred or other amounts were paid.
(b) The application shall be made in such manner and form as may be
required by the applicable rules of court or, in the absence thereof, by
direction of a court to which it is made. Such application shall be upon
notice to the corporation. The court may also direct that notice be given
at the expense of the corporation to the shareholders and such other persons as it may designate in such manner as it may require.
(c) Where indemnification is sought by judicial action, the court may allow
a person such reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, during a
pendency of the litigation as are necessary in connection with his defense
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therein, if the court shall find that the defendant has by his pleadings
or during the course of the litigation raised genuine issues of fact or law.
S 726. Other provisions affecting indemnification of directors and
officers.
(a) All expenses incurred in defending a civil or criminal action or
proceeding which are advanced by the corporation under paragraph (c)
of section 724 . . . or allowed by a court under paragraph (c) of section
725 . . . shall be repaid in case the person receiving such advancement
or allowance is ultimately found, under the procedures set forth in this
article, not to be entitled to indemnification or, where indemnification is
granted, to the extent the expenses so advanced by the corporation or
allowed by the court exceed-the indemnification to which he is entitled.
(b) No indemnification, advancement or allowance shall be made under
this article in any circumstance where it appears: (1) That the indemnification would be inconsistent with the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation of a foreign corporation which prohibits or otherwise limits such indemnification; (2) That the indemnification would be inconsistent with a
provision of the certificate of incorporation, a by-law, a resolution of the
board or of the shareholders, an agreement or other corporate action,
in effect at the time of the accrual of the alleged cause of action asserted
in the threatened or pending action or proceeding in which the expenses
were incurred or other amounts were paid, which prohibits or otherwise
limits indemnification; or (3) If there has been a settlement approved by
the court, that the indemnification would be inconsistent with any condition with respect to indemnification expressly imposed by the court in
approving the settlement.
(c) If, under this article, any expenses or other amounts are paid by way
of indemnification, otherwise than by court order or action by the
shareholders, the corporation shall not later than the next annual meeting
of shareholders unless such meeting is held within three months from
the date of such payment, and, in any event, within fifteen months from
the date of such payment, mail to its shareholders of record at the time
entitled to vote for the election of directors a statement specifying the
persons paid, the amounts paid, and the nature and status at the time
of such payment of the litigation or threatened litigation.
(d) The provisions of this article relating to idemnification of directors
or officers and insurance therefore shall apply to domestic corporations
and foreign corporations doing business in this state, except as provided
in section 1320 ...
. 727. Insurance fbr indemnification of directors and officers.
(a) Subject to paragraph (b), a corporation shall have power to purchase
and maintain insurance: (1) To indemnify the corporation for any obligation which it incurs as a result of the indemnification of directors and
officers under the provisions of this article, and (2) to indemnify directors
and officers in instances which they may be indemnified by the corporation under the provisions of this article, and (3) to indemnify directors
and officers in instances which they may not otherwise be indemnified
by the corporation under the provisions of this article provided the contract of insurance covering such directors and officers provides, in a manner
acceptable to the superintendent of the insurance, for retention amount
and for co-insurance.
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statutes than the more liberal MBCA type."' Although there are certain advantages to both statutes, the New York BCL enables closer
control over corporate actions while allowing greater public accountability and less opportunity for abuse of corporate power. Comparison
of the New York BCL indemnification provisions with the
DelawareMBCA provisions compels the inevitable conclusion that the
New York-type statute is preferable from a policy standpoint.
Perhaps the single most important restriction placed upon
management by the New York BCL is the exclusivity provision," 5
whereby any by-law or other corporate action is invalid to the extent
that it is inconsistent with the statute. This represents a fundamental ideological departure from the more common and traditional nonexclusive statute such as the MBCA. By structuring the New York
BCL as the exclusive right to indemnification, the drafters express
their intent to provide strict guidelines within which corporate directors must function and from which no material deviation will be
permitted. 7 " Indeed, the legislative history of this section suggests
it was included because of the need to clarify the extent to which
statutory indemnification provisions place limits upon corporate
freedom to indemnify in various other forms." The exclusivity provi-

(b) No insurance under paragraph (a) may provide for any payment, other
than cost of defense, to or on behalf of any director or officer. (1) If a
judgment or other final adjudication adverse to the insured director or
officer establishes that his acts of active and deliberate dishonesty were
material to the cause of action so adjudicated, or that he personally gained
in fact a financial profit or other advantage to which he was not legally
entitled, or (2) in relation to any risk the insurance of which is prohibited
under the insurance law of this state.
(c) Insurance under any or all subparagraphs of paragraph (a) may be included in a single contract or supplement thereto. Retrospective rated
contracts are prohibited.
(d) The corporation shall, within the time and to the persons provided
in paragraph (c) of section 726 . . . mail a statement in respect to any
insurance it has purchased or renewed under this section, specifying the
insurance carrier, date of the contract, cost of the insurance, corporate
positions of the insured, and a statement explaining all sums, not previously
recorded in a statement to shareholders, paid under any indemnification
insurance contract.
(e) This section is a public policy of this state to spread the risk of corporate management, notwithstanding any other general or special law of
this state or of any other jurisdiction including the federal government.
174. Bishop, Indemniication, supra note 39, at 838.
175. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 721 (McKinney 1963).
176. Id.
177. A study published in the HARV. Bus. REV. provides concrete evidence in
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sion of section 721 establishes a foundation for subsequent comprehensive sections allowing indemnification under strictly guarded
circumstances.
Section 722 governs authorization for indemnification of directors in derivative actions.' 8 The indemnity offered in this section is
permissive in nature. Section 722(a) stipulates that indemnity for a
director may be authorized in payment of reasonable expenses actually
and necessarily incurred by him in the defense or appeal of a
derivative action against him, except in relation to a matter in which
the director is adjudged to have breached his duty to the corporation. 9
This section constitutes an improvement over the comparable
MBCA subsection 5(b). The two-prong standard of conduct established
in the MBCA subsection 5(b) where the director must have acted in
".. . good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or
not opposed to the best interests of the corporation . ... "' is a much
less stringent standard than that advanced in the New York BCL.
By establishing an affirmative duty to the corporation as the requisite
standard of conduct in derivative actions, the New York legislature
has made the director accountable to a higher degree for his actions.
Considering the nature of a derivative suit'8 ' and the requirements
which the fiduciary duty toward the corporation place on a director,'82
there is clearly a need for close scrutiny of a director's activity when
sued in this fashion.
Subsection 722(b) of the New York BCL enumerates further

support of this more conservative approach to corporation law. The report, based upon
a study of resolutions and amendments to by-laws and charter provisions proposed
to shareholders of 100 large corporations during the period 1938 to 1941, underscored
the danger of perpetuating the non-exclusive system of indemnification. It revealed
an excessive amount of irresponsibility in corporate managment and a consequent need
to tighten the strictures on the freedom of directors to indemnify. After examination
of the indemnification proposals, the authors commented: "Extensions of the scope
of these agreements removes much of the ring of truth from the original cry that
managements seek only protection from 'unfounded suits.' It must be inferred that
managements are attempting to escape responsibilities attaching to their offices ......
In response to such evidence of irresponsible corporate directors abusing the power
inherent in non-exclusive statutes, New York adopted their exclusivity provision. Bates
and Zuckert, Directors' Indemnity: Corporate Policy or Public Policy, 20 HARV. Bus.
REV.

244 (1942).
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 722 (McKinney 1963).
This duty is enumerated in S 717 of the statute.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(b) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(b) (1974).
See supra note 23.
See supra note 57.
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.restrictions on the corporate power of permissive idemnification in
stockholder derivative suits. 83 The corporation may only indemnify
the director against expenses, never judgments.84' Nor may the corporation indemnify against amounts paid in settling or otherwise
disposing of an action, whether pending or merely threatened; or expenses incurred in defending a threatened or pending action which
is settled or otherwise disposed of without court approval. 5 The purpose of this provision is primarily to protect against secret or collusive settlements." By requiring court approval before granting an
award of indemnity for expenses incurred in settling a derivative action, the statute guarantees that the required standard of conduct
has been met.
Furthermore, the New York BCL, unlike the MBCA, does not
contain a provision permitting the court to award indemnification notwithstanding an adjudication of liability.' Thus, the New York BCL
succeeds in allowing indemnification of a director sued in a stockholder
derivative action only for expenses incurred in defense of appeal where
the director has been found not to have breached his duty to the corporation. Under the exclusivity provision,'88 this minimum right to indemnification is not necessarily guaranteed. The exclusivity clause provides that statutory rights to indemnification may not be broadened,
but they could be restricted by proper corporate action.'89 A corporation is therefore free to adopt narrow indemnification provisions at
its discretion. Indemnification under these circumstances is justifiable
and consistent with the goals of sound public policy.
Section 723 of the New York BCL 98 empowers a corporation to
indemnify directors in third-party actions. As in the case of the MBCA,
in third-party actions the allowable extent of indemnification is broader
than in derivative actions.' Indemnification in third-party suits is permissive in nature. Under this section a director may be indemnified
for his litigation expenses, judgments, amounts paid in settling civil
suits, and fines in criminal cases. 92 A director may be indemnified

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 722(b) (McKinney 1963).
Id.
Id.
Johnston, supra note 2, at 2001.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(b) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5 145(b) (1974).
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 721 (McKinney 1963).
See Johnston, supra note 2.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 723 (McKinney 1963).
Id.
Id. at S 723(a) (McKinney 1963).
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either for suits actually instituted against him or suits merely
threatened. 93'
Unlike the MBCA-type statute, the New York BCL makes no
specific provision for indemnification in administrative and investigative proceedings. In simply making reference to civil and criminal suits,
the BCL might preclude indemnity in many of the now commonplace
SEC or other agency investigative proceedings."' Like the MBCA,
however, the BCL does provide a director with indemnity for actions
brought by or in the right of another corporation which he has served
at the request of his corporation.' 5 The right of indemnification also
extends to actions by or in the right of a partnership, joint venture,
trust, employee benefit plan'" or other enterprise which he has served
at the request of the corporation.'97 The rights of indemnification provided in third-party actions under this section are available subject
to meeting the applicable standards of conduct as established in the
section.
The New York BCL subsection 723(a) differentiates between the
standards of conduct required to allow indemnification in criminal actions, civil proceedings by any independent third-party entity, and civil
proceedings by another corporation or entity which the director served
by request.'99 In criminal proceedings, the director must have acted
in good faith, for a purpose which he reasonably believed to be in
the best interests of the corporation and had no reasonable cause to
believe that his conduct was unlawful.'99 For a civil proceeding by an
independent third-party entity, a grant of indemnification requires that
the director have acted in good faith, for a purpose which he
reasonably believed to be in the best interest of his corporation.'" 9
For civil proceedings against the director by another business entity
which he served at the request of his corporation, the director must
have acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to
be in or not opposed to the best interests of his corporation"°' to be
entitled to indemnification.
193. Id.
194. See generally, KNEPPER, supra note 2.
195. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 723(a) (McKinney 1963).
196. Extended indemnification coverage under this section is of particular importance in view of the 1974 Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act (ERISA)
which creates another avenue for potential liability of a director.
197. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 723(a) (McKinney 1963).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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The standards of conduct established in the New York BCL are
more stringent than the standards required under the MBCA. The
MBCA-type statute provides indemnification upon a finding that the
director acted in a manner "in or not opposed to the best interests
of the corporation" with regard to all third-party actions." The New
York BCL requires an affirmative type of conduct, wherein the director must have acted for a purpose he reasonably believed to be in
the corporation's best interests. 3 The negative "or not opposed to"
standard established in the MBCA allows for leniency and ambiguity
in application of the provisions to actual situations.2 4 The distinctions
made between various types of proceedings under the New York BCL
render clarity as to the extent of protection available. For the majority of cases falling under general third-party suits, the standard
of conduct advanced is stringent enough to insure adequate accountability of the corporate directors to society as a whole.
One issue remaining unclear under the New York BCL is whether
directors are entitled to indemnity in suits arising merely because
25
of their "insider" status and the requisite standard of conduct. If
a director trading in the corporation's stock is sued for violation of
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, and is successful on the merits,
should he be entitled to idemnification?"° Arguably, he could be
deemed entitled to indemnification because the only reason he was
sued was due to his "insider" status."7 However, if he was actually
acting only for his own personal benefit, rather than in the best interests of the corporation, 08 he has therefore not met the statutory
requirement for indemnification. The MBCA purports to solve this
problem by the use of the phrase "in or not opposed to" the best
interests of the corporation as part of the standard of conduct.0 9
It might be argued that although the "or not opposed to" phrase
does compel indemnity under certain justifiable circumstances, applying the broad standard to all third-party actions against a director
would permit indemnification of directors in violation of the ultimate
goal of deterring such conduct in society.1 0 Thus, New York's limited
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(a) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 723(a) (McKinney 1963).

S 145(a) (1974).

See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
Johnston, supra note 2, at 2001-2002.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S5(a) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(a) (1974).
See generally Bishop, New Trends, supra note 2.
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use of the broad standard is preferable. Limited use of the broad standard of conduct is also desirable when indemnity may be granted for
amounts paid in settlement.
The MBCA"' and New York BCL 12 are similar in their allowance
of indemnification for amounts paid in settling third-party actions. As
noted earlier,
a guarantee of indemnification for settlement of actions may encourage directors to settle rather than risk a potential
determination of misconduct if the case is heard on the merits.
However, the impropriety of indemnification under these circumstances
is greater with the MBCA provisions than the New York BCL. Both
statutes allow indemnification for amounts paid in settling third-party
actions only after a determination is made that the director met the
stated standard of conduct. The MBCA requires the director to have
acted "in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be
'
in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation." 14
This
standard is less stringent than the New York standard governing
third-party suits by a disinterested third party. The standard of conduct required by the New York BCL is that the director have acted
"in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in the
best interests of the corporation. 2.. Thus, although the possibility may
still exist for abuse of power by allowing indemnification of a director for amounts paid in settlement, the danger is lessened by requiring compliance with strict standards of conduct under the New York
216
BCL.
Subsection 724(a) of the New York BCL establishes that a director who is "wholly successful on the merits or otherwise" in defense
of a derivative action or third-party suit against him is entitled to
indemnification as of right.217 This right is mandatory, provided that
211.
212.
213.

MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(a) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 723(a) (McKinney 1963).

5 145(a) (1974).

See generally supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(a) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5 145(a) (1974).
215. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 723(a) (McKinney 1963).
216. The remainder of N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 723 establishes the procedural
presumptions underlying the substantive provisions of subsection (a). Subsection (b)
stipulates that termination of a civil or criminal action in various ways shall not create
a presumption that the director acted in a manner not in compliance with the requisite standard of conduct. This section, like the MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(a)
(1979) provides assurance that indemnity will not be denied a director without an appropriate determination that he has not met the standard of conduct. Subsection (c)
expands the details of indemnification awarded for violation of ERISA requirements,
and clarifies the fact that indemnity may be awarded for these violations, provided
that the director otherwise satisfied the statutory standards.
217. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 724(a) (McKinney 1963).
214.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1982

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 [1982], Art. 3
266

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

the director is in compliance with the standards of conduct set forth
in sections 722 and 723.218 If the corporate management refuses to
indemnify the director in such a case, the court will enforce his right.219
A guarantee of indemnity for the director, who is vindicated on the
merits of the case, is desirable' as consistent with the goals of sound
public policy and the need to attract qualified people to the board
of directors." The requirement of complete success before mandating
indemnification under the New York BCL serves to alleviate a portion of the leniency inherent in the clause "on the merits or otherwise." For example, a director could not be granted mandatory indemnification for a portion of a suit against him terminated on technical
grounds where he is found guilty of misconduct for another portion.
Conceivably, given these same facts, under an MBCA-type statute,
partial indemnity could be granted, provided the director had acted
in a manner "in or not opposed to" the best interests of the corporation.222 Such a result would clearly be inconsistent with the goal of
maximizing public accountability of the corporation and upholding the
directors' duty of integrity to both the corporation and to society as
a whole.
The second paragraph of section 724 establishes the procedure
to be followed before making a grant of indemnity where the action
against a director has been settled or the director has not been wholly successful in his defense.223 Under these circumstances, no indemnification may be allowed except upon a post hoc determination in
the specific case by an impartial entity that the director is entitled
to indemnity. 4 The New York BCL provides for authorization of
indemnification upon determination by the board, acting by a quorum
consisting of directors who are not parties to the action, that the director has met the standard of conduct as stated in section 722" 5 or 723.'
If a qualified quorum of directors is not obtainable, the determination
may be made by either independent legal counsel in a written opi-

218. Id.
219. Id. See Professional Insurance Co. of New York v. Barry, 60 Misc. 2d 424,
303 N.Y.S.2d 556 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969), affld, 32 App. Div. 2d 898, 302 N.Y.S.2d 722
(1st Dept. 1970).
220. One prominent proponent of this idea, Joseph W. Bishop, is a professor
of law at Yale University and is a noted scholar in this area.
221. Bishop, Indemnification, supra note 39, at 843.
222. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT 5 5(a) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(a) (1974).
223. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 724(b) (McKinney 1963).
224. Id.
225. See supra notes 178-89 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 190-216 and accompanying text.
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nion or by the shareholders.' The various entities authorized to make
a determination of the propriety of the director's 22 8actions under the
New York BCL are the same under the MBCA.
The problems inherent in the use of various tribunals as impartial judges under the MBCA also exist under the New York BCL.
Colleagues of the accused director cannot render an unbiased opinion
with regard to his indemnification.' Neither may the regular outside
corporate counsel be considered sufficiently impartial to insure an
equitable grant of indemnity.2' Also, if a defendant director holds
shares of stock, there remains some doubt under either statute
whether he would be able to exercise his vote as a shareholder in
making the indemnification determination. 1 Clearly, revision is
necessary to remedy such conflicts.
Indemnification of directors by court order is the subject of section 724 of the New York BCL. The BCL makes specific provision
in this section for alternative methods of obtaining indemnification
after a denial of indemnity by the corporation. The statute stipulates
that a court may award indemnification "notwithstanding the failure
of a corporation to grant indemnity, and despite any contrary resolution of the board or of the shareholders.""2 Indemnification under these
circumstances shall be awarded to the extent authorized under
substantive sections 722, 723 and 724(a)," after application by the
director in one of two ways. First, he may apply in the civil action
or proceeding in which the expenses were incurred or other amounts
paid.234 Second, he may apply for indemnification to the state supreme
court in a separate proceeding.2 3 Thus, a director justly deserving
of indemnification according to established guidelines is guaranteed
the award of indemnity.
The legislative history of the New York BCL indicates a desire
to ensure authorization of indemnification by judicial action to the
maximum extent allowed." However, such indemnification must be
within the same constraints established for voluntary indemnification
227.
228.
229.
230,
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW .j724(b)(2)(A&B) (McKinney 1963).
S 5(d) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 145(d) (1974).
See supra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW . 725(a) (McKinney 1963).
Id.
Id. at (1).
Id. at (2).
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW , 725, Legislative Studies and Reports, Comment 947.
MODEL BusINESS CORP. ACT
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by the corporation.237 The New York BCL clearly creates the right
to resort to judicial remedy where the corporation has failed to grant
indemnity to a deserving director.238 The alternative remedy exists
subject to one caveat. No indemnification may be awarded by the court
if the corporation's denial of indemnity was pursuant to a valid corporate action limiting the director's right to indemnification.239 This
section of the New York BCL thus renders much needed clarity to
the concept of court-ordered indemnification: a director of high integrity worthy of the grant of indemnity is ensured its receipt.
Although the right to court-ordered indemnification exists under
the MBCA, it has not been clearly delineated in the same exacting
fashion as in the New York BCL." ' Clarity, such as exists in New
York's indemnification law, renders application of the statute to actual situations less problematic and more consistent. Thus, the right
to court-ordered indemnification to the fullest extent allowable under
required standards of conduct is a principle which should be clearly
established in all indemnification statutes.
The New York BCL is unusual... because it requires notice to
shareholders of any amounts paid in indemnification of a director by
the corporation.' Under section 726, notice to shareholders is required
of any indemnification other than by court order or shareholder
action. 3 The BCL specifies what information must be furnished and
stipulates time limitations for dissemination of the information to
shareholders.2 Requiring notification of shareholders whenever indemnity is awarded is essential to the attainment of an adequate measure
245
of public accountability.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Johnston, supra note 2, at 2003.
242. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 726(c) (McKinney 1963).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Section 726 also contains conflict of laws provisions explaining that the
indemnification sections of New York law pertain both to domestic corporations and
to foreign corporations doing business in New York. The one exception to this provision is contained in section 1320 of the BCL which states that a foreign corporation
will be exempt from the New York indemnification provisions if, at the time indemnity would be considered, either (1) its shares were listed on a national securities exchange or (2) less than one-half of its business income for the preceding three fiscal
years was allocable to New York state for franchise tax purposes. This provision was
enacted to preclude businesses from incorporating in the state of Delaware in order
to benefit from that state's more liberal indemnification provisions when the bulk of
the business' income is generated in New York.
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The final section of the New York BCL which addresses the probem of indemnification of corporate directors pertains to the purchase
of insurance for directors and officers.24 The BCL allows the purchase
of D & 0 insurance for much more restrictive coverage than allowed
under the MBCA."4 7 Section 727 of the New York BCL establishes
that the corporation has the power (subject to certain restrictions)
to purchase D & 0 insurance: (1) to indemnify the corporation for
its obligation to indemnify the directors and officers," 8 (2) to indemnify directors and officers in instances in which they may be indemnified by the corporation under the BCL; 9 and (3) to indemnify directors and officers in instances in which they may not be indemnified
by the corporation.2w The subsection (1) grant of power to buy insurance to indemnify the corporation for its obligation to indemnify
the directors and officers is a reflection of the standard procedure
for D & 0 insurance. Generally, D & 0 insurance is purchased as
a two-part package, with one part covering the corporation's obligation to indemnify and a second part offering coverage of the directors and officers in situations where the corporation may not
indemnify.' 1 In most circumstances, the scope of insurance provided
under subsection (3) would be of primary concern to the director.
Restrictions on the right to purchase indemnification insurance
which exist in New York are more stringent than those in most other
states.' In particular, the restricted right to insurance afforded under
the New York BCL is markedly different from the broad right to insure the director "whether or not the corporation would have the
power to indemnify him against such liability under other provisions,"" as stated in the MBCA. The strictures placed upon D & 0
insurance in this section of the New York BCL are twofold. First,
if the insurance is desired to offer protection where the director may
not otherwise be indemnified by the corporation, the policy must provide for a retention (a type of deductible) and co-insurance" amount
25
Sec"in a manner acceptable to the superintendent of insurance.""
246.

N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 727 (McKinney 1963).
247. Id.
248. Id. at (a)(1).
249. Id. at (a)(2) [emphasis supplied].
250. Id. at (a)(3) [emphasis supplied].
251. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 2013.
252. Id. at 2004.
253. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(g) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(g) (1974).
254. For a more thorough discussion of these requirements, see Johnston, supra
note 2, at 2014.
255. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 727(a)(3) (McKinney 1963).
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ondly, the insurance policy may not provide for any payment other
than expenses of defense: "(1) if a judgment or other final adjudication adverse to the insured director establishes that his acts of active and deliberate dishonesty were material to the cause of action
so adjudicated, or that he personally gained in fact a financial profit
or other advantage to which he was not legally entitled; or (2) in relation to any risk the insurance of which is prohibited under the insurance law of this state."' ' The restrictions in this last section of
the New York BCL are included pursuant to public policy considerations precluding insurance against certain types of misconduct, including gross negligence, self-dealing and total abdication of fiduciary
2 5
responsibility. 1
The final subsections of section 727 of the BCL further stipulate
that retrospective-rated contracts are prohibited,2 5' and that notice to
stockholders is required upon purchase of D & 0 insurance.2 59 The
New York BCL also provides that, "[tihis section is the public policy
of this state to spread the risk of corporate management, notwithstanding any other general or special law of this state or of any other
jurisdiction including the federal government. ' 260 The reason for this
provision is apparently to state for the courts' benefit an intent to
liberally interpret statutory provisions in favor of director indemnification, despite federal laws or prior policies which might be deemed
to disfavor indemnification of directors.2 6' Thus, the legislators appear
to favor awards of indemnity to the maximum extent allowed within
the specifically enumerated restrictions in the BCL.
As previously explained,2 "2 D & 0 insurance policies were highly
controversial when they first appeared. The debate as to the propriety of insuring against certain types of misconduct continues. However,
the prevalence today of D & 0 policies in various forms indicates their
general acceptance as another type of compensation for executives
and a way of attracting capable managers. D & 0 insurance policies,
as allowed under the New York BCL indemnification section subject
to explicitly stated restraints, would be acceptable to all but the most

256. Id. at (b).
257. See Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191
(6th Cir. 1943).
258. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 727(c) (McKinney 1963).
259. Id. at (d). Notice is required pursuant to the stipulations indicated in S 72 6(c).
260. Id. at (e).
261. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 2005.
262. See supra notes 162-171 and accompanying text.
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critical opponents of the practice. The more offensive type of D &
0 insurance, enabling the purchase of coverage for virtually anything
deemed appropriate by the corporation, is the primary target of their
criticism. Where the statutory scheme provides guidelines within
which the corporation must operate when purchasing insurance
coverage, there is assurance of at least a minimum amount of corporate accountability to society, and the possibilities for abuse of
power are narrowed.
The more conservative approach to corporate law, demonstrated
in the New York BCL indemnification provisions, reveals an intent
to hold corporate directors to a higher degree of responsibility for
the consequences of their actions than required under the MBCA. New
York's exclusivity provision,263 coupled with more stringent standards
of conduct required' to allow an award of indemnity, serves to
preclude indemnification of corporate directors in situations violative
of traditional notions of good faith and fiduciary responsibility. u5 Given
the existence of a perceived "corporate crime wave" in America,"
the restrictive approach to indemnification taken by New York is the
preferred approach. Accordingly, many state statutes which either
resemble the MBCA or are not comprehensive' in scope should be
reformed to meet the societal attitudes of today. Among those statutes
in need of reform is the State of Indiana's which consists of provisions rendering illusory any attempt at encouraging corporate responsibility toward society.
INDIANA'S INDEMNIFICATION PROVISION:

A

FAILURE

AT CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY

The Indiana corporate indemnification provision267 is deficient in
many respects. Unlike most modern indemnification provisions, including the MBCA and New York BCL, the Indiana Act is not
263.
264.
265.
266.
supra note
267.

N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 721 (McKinney 1963).
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 722(a), S 723(a) (McKinney 1963).
See supra note 57.
Clayton Fritchy in the N.Y. Post, January 22, 1976, as cited in Johnston,
2, at 1993.
IND. CODE S 23-1-2-2(b)(9). The text of the Indiana provision reads as follows:
(9) to indemnify any person who is or was a director, officer,
employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request
of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another
corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise, against
expenses reasonably incurred by him in connection with the defense of
any action, suit or proceeding, civil or criminal, in which he is made or
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comprehensive.' Although the Act is permissive 9 in nature, allowing a corporation to indemnify its directors under certain circumstances, the criteria upon which a decision to award indemnity
must be based are not defined adequately. Standards of conduct which
must be met and situations in which indemnification is permitted are
not enumerated with sufficient clarity to afford necessary guidelines
for corporate policy-makers. Lack of specificity necessarily renders
the Act ambiguous and subject to differing interpretations. Further,
the non-exclusivity... of the Act and the unrestricted right to purchase D & 0 insurance,"' when coupled with the vague substantive
provisions, reveal a denial of even minimal public accountability.
Therefore, the Indiana Act should be reformed.
Statutory Framework
At the outset, the Indiana Act purports to provide indemnity
for a director against expenses reasonably incurred in the defense
of any action, suit or proceeding whether civil or criminal, in which
threatened to be made, a party by reason of being or having been in
any such capacity, or arising out of his status as such, except in relation
to matters as to which he is adjudged in such action, suit or proceeding,
civil or criminal, to be liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of duty to the corporation: Provided, however, That such indemnification shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those
indemnified may be entitlted under any provision of the articles of incorporation, by-laws, resolution or other authorization heretofore or hereafter
adopted, after notice, by a majority vote of all the voting shares then
issued and outstanding; and provided further that expenses incurrd in
defending any action, suit, or proceeding, civil or criminal, may be paid
by the corporation in advance of the final disposition of such action, suit,
or proceeding notwithstanding any provisions of this article to the contrary upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of the director, officer, employee, or agent to repay the amount paid by the corporation
if it shall ultimately be determined that the director, officer, employee,
or agent is not entitled to indemnification as provided in this section;
(10) to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of any person
who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation,
or is or was serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise against any liability asserted against him
and incurred by him in any such capacity, or arising out of his status
as such, whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify him against such liability under the provisions of this section.
268. Originally enacted in 1959, the Act was subsequently amended in 1969
and 1973.
269. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
271. IND. CODE S 23-1-2-2(b)(10) (Supp. 1981).
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he is made or threatened to be made a party. 2 This broad grant of
authority is problematic in several ways. Granting the power to indemnify against "expenses reasonably incurred" places no definitional
limitation upon what constitutes "expenses." The possibility of indemnifying against judgments, fines and settlements is neither confirmed
nor denied. Considering the non-exclusive nature of the Indiana Act,
indemnity could presumably be awarded for any amount paid,
regardless of the classification of payment. However, the lack of
specific reference to these possibilities creates ambiguity in interpretation of the statute.
Unlike most modern indemnification statutes, the Indiana Act
-makes no distinction between stockholder derivative suits and thirdparty actions. Indemnity may be granted in connection with the
defense of any action, whether civil or criminal 73 and whether threatened or pending. Furthermore, a director is entitled to indemnity
either in suits arising merely out of his status or where he is being
sued personally for alleged wrongdoing in his capacity as director.
Although arguably the Act encompasses both proper third-party
suits27 and derivative suits, there are no requisite standards of conduct established and no procedures for determination of the propriety
of indemnification in each case. The only caveat explicitly stated in
the Indiana Act consists of a denial of indemnity where the director
is adjudged liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance
of duty to the corporation. 5 Apparently, any termination of the suit
for procedural reasons, or by settlement, would be proper grounds
for an award of indemnity for expenses." 6 Contrary to widely accepted
notions of equity, the Indiana statutory scheme might permit indemnification for expenses incurred in settling a derivative suit without
any determination as to the propriety of the director's activity or the
propriety of the settlement. Such lenient application of this vague
statute is violative of the public trust and downgrades the importance
of corporate accountability.277
272. Id. at (9).
273. No provision has been made to clarify whether protection is intended to
extend to administrative and investigative proceedings. See supra notes 194-97 and
accompanying text.
274. Galanti, Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law Corporations,7
IND. L. REV. 103, 107 (1973).
275. IND. CODE. 23-1-2-2(b)(9).
276. The reader will be reminded that "expenses" has no specific definitional
limits. Thus, are amounts paid in settlement "expenses?"
277. Despite the clear reference in the Indiana statute, one commentator argues
that in practice, the standards of conduct proposed in the MBCA should be employed
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Difficulties created by the ambiguity of the Indiana indemnification statute are compounded by the problems inherent in a coupling
of a non-exclusive statute with unrestricted rights to purchase D &
0 insurance. 8 When a corporation is allowed to draft by-laws affording indemnification to directors at its discretion, the by-laws will undoubtedly provide indemnity for all but the most flagrant misdeeds. 9
Similarly, an unrestricted right to purchase D & 0 insurance will
generally imply the purchase of broad coverage by many corporations.
Consequently, the issue is again raised whether the corporation may
purchase insurance which effectively frees directors from the fear of
civil liability for breaching their duty of good faith toward the corporation. In the final analysis, an indemnification statute such as the
Indiana Act which establishes virtually no restraint upon the corporation's discretionary right to indemnify its directors, is illusory in its
attempt to provide an adequate measure of corporate accountability.
Proposals for Reform
Analysis of Indiana's indemnification statute illuminates several
possibilities for reform. Of primary concern is the non-exclusivity provision of the statute. Any statutory scheme regulating indemnification, regardless of the extent of restrictions it embodies, is essentially without value when complemented by a blanket non-exclusivity
provision. Despite clear delineation in the statute of restrictions upon
corporate indemnification, these restraints must be considered only
as comment upon the state's public policy, if the corporation is free
to draft additional protection at its discretion. The preferable method
of ensuring adequate protection from liability for the director, in addition to offering a necessary measure of public responsibility, is the
use of a comprehensively drafted statute addressed to specific situations with an accompanying exclusivity provision. The New York
BCL.. ° is exemplary in this regard, providing extensive indemnification protection for directors under the restricted scope of an exclusive
statute. The specific provisions of the New York BCL are worthy of
use as a model in many respects. In particular, the New York BCL
embodies protection to varying degrees for directors sued in thirdparty actions as well as stockholder derivative suits.
in conjunction with the Indiana Act. If this usage is intended, the Indiana legislature
should enact appropriate provisions requiring these standards of conduct to be used
in all cases in order to avoid inconsistency.
278. See supra notes 162-71 and accompanying text.
279. Generally, where gross negligence, negligence, self-dealing or total abdication of corporate responsibility is found, indemnity will be denied.
280. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 721 (McKinney 1963). See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
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The distinction in both substance and procedure between
stockholder derivative suits and third-party actions is of paramount
importance in any reformation scheme for the Indiana statute. The
standards of conduct required and procedures for determining the propriety of an indemnification award must differ because of the distinct
nature of each type of suit. Due to the special fiduciary relationship
between the director and his corporation,"' he must be held to the
highest standards of conduct with respect to his dealings. It is the
fiduciary duty of a director to act in his corporation's best interests.
However, a director may be acting in furtherance of what he
reasonably believes to be the corporation's best interests and still act
wrongfully as to a third party. Where the director is acting in this
fashion, an award of indemnification may be considered more justifiable
than in the stockholder derivative action where the director's fellow
shareholders are suing and where the expectation of his fiduciary duty
is greater.
This scheme of corporate relationship has perhaps best been
analyzed in terms of concentric circles.282 The inner circle deals with
the relationship among shareholders themselves and between shareholders and the corporate management. The outer circle depicts the
relationship between the corporation as a whole and outside third parties. A higher standard of integrity is demanded with regard to transactions in the inner circle, where shareholders are of closer relationship, than in the outer circle. This reasoning, however, is not intended
to imply justification of a lenient attitude toward the standard of care
required in dealing with third parties. Instead, the rationale is intended
to reinforce the necessity of distinguishing between third-party actions and stockholder derivative suits.
The Indiana indemnification Act does not acknowledge the vital
distinction between stockholder derivative actions and third-party
suits. The Act applies in the same manner to both types of action.
The New York BCL, however, is true to the goal of securing the
highest degree of fiduciary care of directors to the shareholders and
corporation. The BCL allows indemnification of directors in derivative
actions283 within a restrictive scope. By allowing the corporation to
indemnify its directors only for expenses, never judgments, in
derivative actions,2u the New York BCL precludes the undesirable

281.

See supra note 57.

282. SCHAEFTLER, supra note 2, at 6-7.
283. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 722 (McKinney 1963).
284. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 722 (McKinney 1963). See supra notes 178-89 and ac-

companying text.
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circuity of payment sometimes possible under the MBCA and its nonexclusivity clause. Under the New York statutory standard of conduct required for a grant of indemnity in stockholder derivative actions, where the director is adjudged to have breached his duty to
the corporation, he will be denied indemnity. This standard is
preferable to that of the MBCA and should be employed in Indiana's
revised statute. Under this standard, the director's good faith belief
that he was acting in furtherance of the corporation's best interests
will be irrelevant if he actually breached his fiduciary duty.
Moreover, integrity of corporate management is further encouraged under the New York BCL both by complete denial of indemnification for amounts paid in settlement28 and prohibition against an
award of indemnity for even expenses in out-of-court settlement of
derivative actions.28 The absence in the New York BCL of a clause
permitting the court to award indemnification for expenses notwithstanding an adjudication of liability287 affords greater protection
to shareholders and the public by enforcing a finding of misconduct.
When these provisions are considered concurrently, their effect is to
compel the utmost integrity from directors when acting within the
scope of their fiduciary duty toward the shareholders and to award
indemnification only to those directors entitled to protection.
The New York BCL is exemplary in the maintenance of a
necessary distinction between third-party' actions and derivative
suits. The permissible extent of indemnification in third-party actions
is defined as requiring the director to act in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the
corporation.' Requirement of the affirmative type of "good faith and
reasonable belief" standard enumerated in the New York BCL should
be employed by the Indiana legislators to preserve the necessary
distinction between third-party actions and derivative suits while still
providing the degree of integrity required for upholding the public
trust.
Under the New York BCL, because investigative and administrative proceedings are not specifically covered,' indemnity may not
be awarded for directors involved in these types of actions. Given

285.
286.

N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 722(b)(1) (McKinney 1963).
Id. at (2).

287.
288.

MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(b) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 723 (McKinney 1963).

289.
290.

Id.
See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
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the frequency of SEC and various other investigative and administrative proceedings, indemnification protection is certainly indicated. In
the Indiana statute, provision should be made for indemnification upon
fulfillment of a pertinent standard of conduct in both administrative
and investigative proceedings, in addition to the coverage of civil and
criminal actions now afforded. The MBCA subsection 5(a)"' contains
this provision, enabling indemnity for the worthy director in both.
The Indiana statute should be patterned after the New York BCL
in another respect. New York's requirement of complete success for
a finding of mandatory indemnification enforceable by court action 2
is preferable to the MBCA allowance of mandatory partial indemnity
for partial success. Presently, the Indiana statute does not address
the possibility of partial success and consequent indemnification.
Neither does the Indiana statute establish distinct procedures or
guidelines for granting mandatory and permissive indemnity. In contrast to the desirable BCL mandatory indemnification provision, the
procedural mechanism for determining the propriety of permissive
indemnification293 is not worthy of imitation by Indiana in its effort
to devise a fully comprehensive indemnification statute.
Both the New York BCL and the MBCA require that a director
not wholly successful in his defense must obtain authorization by an
impartial tribunal before receiving an award of indemnity.' However,
the entities designated in the statute cannot be fully impartial to the
necessary degree. Therefore, to insure the impartiality of at least the
outside independent counsel, guidelines"5 should be utilized. By stating
at least that legal counsel or a law firm engaged within the last five
years by either an accused director or the corporation are not considered independent, some degree of impartiality is guaranteed. This
statutory construction is therefore superior to the unrestrained
ratification pf regular outside counsel as "independent," which is possible under the MBCA and BCL.'
Finally, New York's shareholder notice provision' is yet another
means of ensuring high standards of corporate integrity in its dealings with the public. In addition, New York's restrictive grant of the
291.
293.

MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(a) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5145(a) (1974).
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 724 (McKinney 1963).
Id. at (b).

294.

MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT

292.

S 5(d) (1979);

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5145(d) (1974).

295. Currently, Ohio uses an exemplary provision in this regard. See supra
notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
296. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(d) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(d) (1974).
297. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW j 726(c) (McKinney).
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power to purchase D & 0 insurance is essential to a fully effective
statutory scheme creating maximum corporate accountability. Indiana
29 9
8
currently utilizes an insurance provision identical to the MBCA
in its unrestrained grant of power to purchase insurance. Revision
of the Indiana Act to ensure some measure of integrity and corporate
accountability would necessarily include enactment of provisions
similar to the New York BCL in this regard. In order to effectuate
the necessary reformation of Indiana's indemnification statute, the
substantive proposals advanced herein should be adopted. Such proposals, however, to achieve greatest impact, contemplate a new accountability scheme, one which recognizes the differing roles and
responsibilities of corporate agents.
Virtually all contemporary indemnification statutes are applicable
to "any person who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent"
of the corporation2" Even comprehensive statutory provisions,
however, make no distinction between these agents of the corporation in terms of the scope of their agency. Modern corporations are
comprised of assorted agents acting in diverse roles with varying
degrees of responsibility. Cognizant of this reality, indemnification provisions should embody degrees of protection in accordance with the
differing degrees of responsibility. Design of a statutory scheme
establishing prerequisites for indemnification of agents according to
the scope of their agency would be beneficial to all concerns. Such
an accountability scheme would afford both optimal protection of the
agent and protection of society from abuse of corporate power.
Pursuant to the dual goal of protection, and considering the
realities of corporate governance,' 1 the agent's function and access
to information become important criteria in devising requisite standards of conduct. The primary decision-making unit of the corporation will, logically, be privy to vital information which is easily misused. Agents whose scope of responsibility entails much less access
to information and reduced decision-making capacity are less able to
misuse their limited power. Consequently, in contemplating a grant
of indemnification for a corporate agent, the scope of his responsibility should be considered in ascertaining the requisite standard of
conduct for indemnification.

IND. CODE S 23-1-2-2(b)(9).
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(g) (1979).
300. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT S 5(a) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
145(a) (1974); IND. CODE S 23-1-2-2(b)(9).

298.
299.

301.

See generally

SCHAEFTLER,

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss2/3

supra note 2, at 73.
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Given these assumptions, it is necessary to establish finite limits
within which the diverse corporate agents may function. In the majority of corporate governance structures, officers are the management entity responsible for the core decisions regarding corporate
activity.2" They are given vast power and, concurrently, a wide scope
of responsibility. The standard of conduct for officers should be
stringent and accordingly reflect their greater responsibilities. 3"
The role of corporate directors has, in recent years, been redefined as corporations engage more outside directors.14 In general, a
director owes the duty of fiduciary care to the corporation. However,
outside directors often serve the corporation in a more limited
capacity.. than inside directors. Inside directors are involved in the
day-to-day workings of the corporation and, consequently, have far
greater access to more information." Outside directors are engaged
primarily for their business expertise and impartial objectivity. They
serve the corporation on a limited basis, often only attending board
meetings several times per year, and are not possessed of a working
knowledge of the corporation's daily affairs. Thus, it is imperative
to acknowledge the disparity between potential for abuse of power
by outside versus inside directors. Outside directors should be held
to a lesser standard of conduct in ascertaining the propriety of
30 7
indemnification.
In addition, distinction must be made in accordance with the
scope of authority and possibilities for abuse of power inherent in
the positions of employee/agent. An employee of lesser status who
performs a limited function within the corporate structure and has
minimal access to information does not present the threat to corporate
accountability posed by high-ranking "insiders." Thus, indemnification
provisions must be made for such employees in terms of their limited
sphere of control.
Ultimately, the responsibility for ensuring corporate accountability must exist in each director, officer and employee's explicit duty
to the corporation. Fiduciary duties of loyalty, obedience and honesty
302. Id. at 75.
303. Id.
304. See generally COHEN AND LOEB, supra note 10. In a recent survey of over
1,000 major corporations, more than 60% had boards of directors in which outside
directors constituted a majority. Id. at 13.
305. Outside directors often serve as "idea men," specialists in their field, contributing their expertise to benefit the corporation.
306. SCHAEFTLER, supra note 2, at 74.
307. Id. at 8.
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must be upheld by directors and officers."° Employees must perform
their duties with integrity and good faith. In recognizing the diversity which exists among corporate personnel and establishing requisite
standards of conduct for a grant of indemnification protection in accordance with recognized diversity, the greatest benefit will emerge
for individuals, the corporation, and society.
Indiana, now cognizant of the problems inherent in the construction of its indemnification statute, must initiate reforms to comply
with current public policy which demands corporate accountability.
To ensure fully comprehensive indemnification coverage for deserving directors and officers, distinction must be made between the
various agents in the scope of their responsibilities. Within such a
revised statutory scheme, corporate accountability to the degree
demanded by society can be maintained.
CONCLUSION

Indemnification provisions of modern corporation laws were initially enacted amid rising fear of the great potential for personal
liability often incurred by corporate directors. Protection for these
invaluable overseers of the wealth of the nation's corporations is a
justifiable goal. In an effort to effectuate adequate protection for corporate directors, however, the majority of states have exceeded the
limitation of traditiOnal fiduciary notions. These states often allow indemnification in circumstances strongly indicative of director misconduct. The non-exclusive statute, coupled with a broad grant of authority to purchase indemnification insurance, affords virtually no
assurance of corporate accountability to society. The Indiana statute
is rendered essentially without value by the concurrent problem of
its uncomprehensive scope and lack of clarity. Thus, reformation of
the Indiana indemnification provision is imperative. Utilizing a
framework distinguishing among agents of the corporation would provide the structure necessary for optimal protection of directors performing vital functions in modern corporations, as well as ensuring
the necessary level of accountability to society.
Heidi L. Ulrich
308.

See supra note 57.
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